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REJECTING ‘UNJUSTIFIED’ REJECTION: 
WHY FAMILY COURTS SHOULD EXCLUDE 
PARENTAL ALIENATION EXPERTS 
Abstract: Parental alienation is a controversial and disputed proposed mental 
disorder whereby children unjustifiably reject one parent because of the other 
parent’s influence. One parent often raises parental alienation in family court 
when the other parent makes an accusation of domestic abuse. Despite appearing 
in the legal discourse, no professional organization officially recognizes either 
parental alienation or the related concept of parental alienation syndrome, the 
original anti-feminist theory from which parental alienation derives. Domestic 
violence advocates staunchly criticize both “disorders” because the theories can 
undercut legitimate and concerning abuse allegations. Nonetheless, courts invite 
such experts into the courtroom to aid in making custody determinations. This 
Note argues that parental alienation expert testimony does not meet state eviden-
tiary standards for admissibility. This Note also suggests that courts should be 
cautious when considering abuse allegations, as the consequences of a mistaken 
court decision can be dangerous for children and survivors of domestic violence. 
INTRODUCTION 
When ten-year-old Ana Ionescu walked into a New Jersey Family Court 
in the midst of her parents’ high-conflict divorce, she was determined to con-
vince the judge that she and her brother, Alex, should live with their father be-
cause her mother had physically abused them.1 Instead of following the chil-
dren’s request, the judge, in following the advice of a psychologist, granted 
sole custody of the children to their mother, the parent facing abuse allega-
tions.2 He then ordered the Ionescu children to a family therapy camp with 
their mother where therapists worked to convince the children that the abuse 
never happened.3 The judge made these determinations based on expert testi-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Reveal, Bitter Custody, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING & PRX (Mar. 9, 2019), https://
revealnews.org/podcast/bitter-custody/ [https://perma.cc/ZV7P-PGPS] (detailing how a family court 
judge used parental alienation syndrome as a justification for separating the Ionescu children from 
their preferred custodial parent). The Bitter Custody podcast tells the story of the Ionescu children 
from the perspective of Ana Ionescu, now an adult, who maintains that her mother was abusive toward 
her and her brother. Id. 
 2 Id. Ana and her brother alleged that their mother often refused to feed them, broke their belong-
ings when she was angry, and yelled at them inappropriately. Id. Ana also accused her mother of try-
ing to strangle her. Id. Both Ionescu children told the judge that they were afraid of their mother and 
emphasized that they wanted to live with their father because of their mother’s abuse. Id. 
 3 Id. The program to which the judge sent the Ionescu children and their mother, Family Bridges, 
costs $20,000. Id. While they were at Family Bridges, the children did not have access to their cell 
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mony that the Ionescu children were suffering from parental alienation syn-
drome at the hands of their father.4 
Parental alienation syndrome is a controversial proposed psychological 
disorder whereby one parent manipulates a child into denigrating and genuine-
ly fearing the other parent without justification.5 Despite parental alienation 
syndrome’s existence in the psychological discourse for decades, it has yet to 
gain acceptance by any major scientific organizations, including the American 
Psychiatric Association (APA) and World Health Organization.6 The drafters of 
the most recent versions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Diseases (DSM-5) and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11) 
declined to include parental alienation syndrome in either of these highly-
respected and highly-utilized diagnostic tools, notwithstanding proposals by 
the syndrome’s advocates.7 
                                                                                                                           
phones and were not permitted to speak with their father. Id. The psychologists administering the 
program told the children that they could not leave until they agreed that their father indoctrinated 
them. Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Richard A. Gardner, Parental Alienation Syndrome vs. Parental Alienation: Which Diagnosis 
Should Evaluators Use in Child-Custody Disputes?, 30 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 93, 95 (2002); see 
Kelly Schwartz, Note, The Kids Are Not All Right: Using the Best Interest Standard to Prevent Paren-
tal Alienation and a Therapeutic Intervention Approach to Provide Relief, 56 B.C. L. REV. 803, 806–
10 (2015) (explaining the history and controversy underlying parental alienation syndrome). Dr. Rich-
ard Gardner proposed parental alienation syndrome in 1985 to explain accusations of parental abuse in 
child-custody disputes. Gardner, supra, at 95. He defined parental alienation syndrome as: 
[A] childhood disorder that arises almost exclusively in the context of child-custody 
disputes. Its primary manifestation is the child’s campaign of denigration against a par-
ent, a campaign that has no justification. It results from the combination of a program-
ming (brainwashing) parent’s indoctrinations and the child’s own contributions to the 
vilification of the target parent. 
Id. Parental alienation is an offshoot of parental alienation syndrome. Id. at 98. Gardner, one of many 
parental alienation theorists, differentiates the two by positing that parental alienation syndrome is a 
mental disorder that manifests in the child, whereas parental alienation is a set of behaviors that a 
parent displays to alienate the child from the other parent. Id. at 94–96. 
 6 APA Board of Trustees Approves DSM-5, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Dec. 1, 2012), http://alert.
psychnews.org/2012/12/apa-board-of-trustees-approves-dsm-5.html [https://perma.cc/PS9J-94BL] 
(announcing the rejection of parental alienation syndrome in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders by the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-5)); see Rich-
ard A. Gardner, Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation, 29 ACAD. F. 3, 3–7 (1985) (articu-
lating, for the first time, the concept of parental alienation syndrome). The American Psychiatric As-
sociation (APA) is the leading professional community for American mental health. About APA, AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/B8G2-U4EF]. 
 7 See WILLIAM BERNET, PARENTAL ALIENATION, DSM-5, AND ICD-11, at 3–7 (2010) (articulat-
ing that the purpose of this proposal is to garner parental alienation’s inclusion in the DSM-5 and the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11)); see also ICD v. DSM, 40 MONITOR ON PSYCH., 
Oct. 2009, at 63, https://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/10/icd-dsm [https://perma.cc/6TZP-62MV] (ex-
plaining that both the ICD and the DSM are respected diagnostic systems in the United States and 
globally). The APA rejected this proposal in 2012. APA Board of Trustees Approves DSM-5, supra 
note 6. The APA publishes the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Diseases (DSM), the 
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Even though the disorder has been excluded from diagnostic tools such as 
the DSM-5 and ICD-11, litigants in high-conflict divorce and child custody 
cases often reference parental alienation syndrome and the more modern con-
struction of such symptomology, parental alienation.8 Though similar, parental 
alienation syndrome and parental alienation are distinct concepts.9 Simply put, 
parental alienation syndrome focuses on the problematic and antagonizing be-
havior of the parent that leads children to reject the other, non-alienating par-
ent.10 Alternatively, parental alienation, some theorists suggest, looks only at 
the behavior of the so-called alienated child and how that child reacts to the 
non-alienating, alienated parent.11 
                                                                                                                           
standard tool used in the United States by mental health professionals on a “periodic[]” basis. DSM-5: 
Frequently Asked Questions, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/
practice/dsm/feedback-and-questions/frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/FJ7G-8X4L] (ex-
plaining that the DSM has gone through several revisions since its inception in 1952); The Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Health Disorders, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://www.apaservices.
org/practice/reimbursement/icd-diagnostic/dsm-5?_ga=2.3103152.1232791211.1579566596-28369
9059.1575261566 [https://perma.cc/TX24-566Q]. The international mental health community, over-
seen by the World Health Organization (WHO), publishes the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD), which, like the DSM-5, is a classification system used to diagnose mental disorders. See WHO 
Releases New International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11), WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 18, 2018), 
https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/18-06-2018-who-releases-new-international-classification-of-
diseases-(icd-11) [https://perma.cc/K5AE-7NWG]. The ICD is used for statistical and billing infor-
mation in the United States and internationally. WORLD HEALTH ORG., FAQ’S FOR ICD-11, https://
www.who.int/classifications/icd/revision/icd11faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/NLM9-LL4R]. One hun-
dred-seventeen countries use the ICD in some capacity. Id. 
 8 See, e.g., Gladwin v. Gilbert, No. D197102, 2001 Cal. SUPER. LEXIS 418, at *20–24 (Super. 
Ct. Feb. 22, 2001) (changing an existing custody order because of evidence of parental alienation); 
M.A. v. A.I., No. A-4021-11T1, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2887, at *5 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 
Dec. 15, 2014) (changing an existing custody order because of evidence of parental alienation syn-
drome); In re F.S.-P. v. A.H.R., 844 N.Y.S.2d 644, 646 (Fam. Ct. 2007) (holding that parental aliena-
tion can be raised as an affirmative defense to establishing a child support order). 
 9 See infra notes 24–74 and accompanying text (highlighting the differences between parental 
alienation syndrome and parental alienation); see, e.g., Gardner, supra note 5, at 112–13 (summariz-
ing the differences between parental alienation syndrome and parental alienation for use of both con-
cepts in court). Dr. Richard Gardner, the creator of parental alienation syndrome, posited that testimo-
ny about both parental alienation syndrome and parental alienation could strengthen parents’ positions 
in child custody disputes. Gardner, supra note 5, at 93. He suggested that experts testifying in court 
should discuss parental alienation syndrome when working with families where one parent alienated 
the children. Id. at 112–13. 
 10 Gardner, supra note 5, at 95 (“[Parental alienation syndrome] results from the combination of a 
programming (brainwashing) parent’s indoctrinations and the child’s own contributions to the vilifica-
tion of the target parent.”). 
 11 See infra notes 63–74 and accompanying text. By focusing on the behavior of the child and not 
on the behavior of the parent, those who advocate for parental alienation are able to suggest that it is, 
in fact, a disorder worthy of inclusion in diagnostic classifications like the DSM. See BERNET, supra 
note 7, at 4 (explaining that the definition was crafted with the format of the DSM-5 in mind; thus, the 
disorder only looks at the behavior of the child and not the quality of the relationship). 
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Parental alienation syndrome is more controversial than parental aliena-
tion because of its alleged gender bias.12 Early proponents of the syndrome 
hypothesized that only mothers induced parental alienation syndrome in their 
children. Furthermore, because it proscribes to be a mental disorder, despite its 
focus on relational issues, parental alienation syndrome has lent itself to con-
troversy.13 Finally, parental alienation syndrome also has close ties to Dr. 
Richard Gardner, who proposed its existence based on personal experience and 
not on scientific data.14 Because of the inherent controversy surrounding pa-
rental alienation syndrome, parents seeking custody today are more likely to 
raise parental alienation in family law cases, but they may also raise parental 
alienation syndrome.15 
In child custody cases, especially where there is an allegation of domestic 
violence, sexual assault, or child abuse, courts may need to consider the admis-
sibility of the two controversial proposed diagnoses.16 Whether such evidence 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 5, 104–06 (discussing, from the perspective of Gardner, the ac-
cusation that parental alienation syndrome has a gender bias). Gardner denies that his diagnosis of 
parental alienation syndrome is “sexist.” Id. He points out that parental alienation syndrome is more 
controversial than parental alienation, in part, because of the syndrome’s association with him. Id. at 
111–12.  
 13 See, e.g., Hanson v. Spolnik, 685 N.E.2d 71, 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (Chezem, J., dissenting 
and concurring in result) (recognizing the existence of parental alienation but doubting the existence 
of parental alienation syndrome based on Gardner’s gender bias, concluding: “This gender-biased 
generalization is ludicrous and an affront to all reasonable women and men”); see also Sandi S. Var-
nado, Inappropriate Parental Influence: A New App for Tort Law and Upgraded Relief for Alienated 
Parents, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 113, 117 n.12 (2011) (indicating that parental alienation syndrome fo-
cuses on the relationship between the parent and child, whereas parental alienation concerns only the 
parent). A mental disorder is a set of behaviors, emotions, or cognitions that result in psychological, 
biological, or developmental distress. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 20 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]. Although relationship issues 
may be areas for clinical attention, the APA does not consider them mental disorders. Id. at 22 (ex-
plaining that relational problems are included in a chapter on potential focuses of clinical attention but 
not in the catalogue of mental disorders).  
 14 See infra notes 33–62 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the underlying theory 
and controversy of parental alienation syndrome); see also RICHARD A. GARDNER, SEX ABUSE HYS-
TERIA: SALEM WITCH TRIALS 2 (1991) (recognizing his own “paucity of references to other publica-
tions” in his book). 
 15 See J.F. v. D.F., No. 2012/01795, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5991, at *10 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 6, 2018) 
(providing an overview of parental alienation in New York family courts). Compare Mastrangelo v. 
Mastrangelo, No. NNHFA054012782S, 2012 WL 6901161, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2012) 
(holding that parental alienation syndrome is not admissible under state evidentiary standards), with 
Zafran v. Zafran, 740 N.Y.S.2d 596, 600 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (allowing an evidentiary hearing to argue for 
the admissibility of parental alienation syndrome evidence), aff’d, 761 N.Y.S.2d 317 (App. Div. 2003). 
 16 See In re Karen B. v. Clyde M., 574 N.Y.S.2d 267, 271–72 (Fam. Ct. 1991) (examining the 
admissibility of parental alienation syndrome raised by a father after a mother accused him of sexually 
abusing their daughter), aff’d sub nom. Karen PP v. Clyde QQ, 602 N.Y.S.2d 709, 709 (App. Div. 
1993); Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding Judi-
cial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 657, 679 (2003) (empha-
sizing that men accused of abuse by female partners often raise parental alienation syndrome as a 
defense to that allegation in family law cases). In family court, parents may also raise parental aliena-
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is admissible, or should be relied upon, is highly debated in the legal and psy-
chological spaces.17 Part I of this Note discusses the history, theory, controver-
sy, and critiques of both parental alienation syndrome, as posited by Gardner, 
and its more modern construction, parental alienation.18 Part I also explores the 
basic mechanics of custody proceedings and the role of expert testimony in the 
family court setting.19 Part II of this Note provides an overview of the ways in 
which family courts have used evidence of parental alienation syndrome and 
parental alienation in their decisions.20 Part II also details the arguments in fa-
vor of and against the admission of evidence of both theories in family law 
courts.21 Part III then argues that admission of evidence of parental alienation 
syndrome and parental alienation does not meet the evidentiary standards nec-
essary for expert opinion evidence to be admissible in family court.22 Part III 
also contends that admission of such evidence undercuts allegations of abuse 
in these cases.23 
                                                                                                                           
tion as a defense to paying child support. See, e.g., Usack v. Usack, 793 N.Y.S.2d 223, 225 (App. Div. 
2005) (holding that evidence of parental alienation is admissible as an affirmative defense to a custo-
dial parent’s complaint for child support). In 2005 in Usack v. Usack, the Supreme Court of New 
York, Appellate Division held that “parental estrangement” was a valid reason to suspend child sup-
port payments to the alienating parent. Id. at 224–25. Lower courts in New York interpreted the Usack 
holding to mean that, if one party demonstrates parental alienation, the court can suspend that party’s 
child support payments. See In re F.S.-P. v. A.H.R., 844 N.Y.S.2d 644, 645–46 (Fam. Ct. 2007) (ref-
erencing Usack to hold that parental alienation can be raised as a defense to child support, even before 
a child support order is granted). 
 Even outside of the courtroom, parental alienation syndrome and parental alienation are contro-
versial in the legal field. Compare Schwartz, supra note 5, at 827–29 (arguing that parental alienation 
is a serious problem that should be handled in family court), with Meier, supra, at 679, 688–90 (sug-
gesting that application of parental alienation in family law cases undermines allegations of domestic 
and child abuse, particularly because both were “invented to rebut mothers’ claims of child abuse”). 
 17 See infra notes 75–89 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 33–74 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 90–128 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 130–158 and accompanying text. One student Comment has argued that paren-
tal alienation syndrome does not meet the Daubert or Frye standards. Cheri L. Wood, Comment, The 
Parental Alienation Syndrome: A Dangerous Aura of Reliability, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1367, 1368 
(1994). This Note argues that parental alienation, too, does not meet the Daubert or Frye standards. 
See infra notes 130–158 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 130–158 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 159–183 and accompanying text. The available case law for this Note is some-
what limited because most family law cases are handled at the trial level in unpublished opinions, and 
litigants rarely appeal the decisions. See The Problem, DV LEAP, https://www.dvleap.org/problem 
[https://perma.cc/SX3E-7D8Z] (stating that appeals in family law cases are an effective but rarely 
used tool for rectifying unjust family court decisions). 
 23 See infra notes 184–223 and accompanying text. 
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I. SAME, BUT DIFFERENT: PARENTAL ALIENATION  
SYNDROME AND PARENTAL ALIENATION 
Researchers suggest that parental alienation syndrome and parental al-
ienation have profoundly negative long-term impacts on children and par-
ents.24 Such concerns have led to courts’ admitting evidence of both of these 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Amy J.L. Baker, The Long-Term Effects of Parental Alienation on Adult Children: A Qualita-
tive Research Study, 33 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 289, 293 (2005) (summarizing the negative effects of 
parental alienation found in a qualitative study conducted on adults who reported experiencing paren-
tal alienation as children). Alienation may lead to self-esteem problems, self-harm, anxiety, depres-
sion, guilt, or fear. Id. at 301. In fact, Dr. Amy Baker, who spearheaded the study, found that those 
who participated and reported being alienated as children often had drug and alcohol problems and 
found themselves alienated from their own children. Id. A child who bases future relationships on 
alienating relationships learned from a parent may also have long-term relational troubles. See id. at 
300–01; see also Elisabeth Godbout & Claudine Parent, The Life Paths and Lived Experiences of 
Adults Who Have Experienced Parental Alienation: A Retrospective Study, 53 J. DIVORCE & REMAR-
RIAGE 34, 46 (2012) (illustrating that participants in a qualitative study often felt like they needed 
therapy to fully come to terms with their experience with parental alienation). Proponents of parental 
alienation syndrome and parental alienation also consider both to be child abuse. See, e.g., Jennifer J. 
Harman et al., Prevalence of Parental Alienation Drawn from a Representative Poll, 66 CHILD. & 
YOUTH SERVS. REV. 62, 62 (2016) (suggesting that parental alienation is a form of child abuse be-
cause it is an intentional behavior that harms the child). Some professionals propose that parental 
alienation can have a traumatic impact on children in their adult lives. Id. State and federal laws define 
child abuse statutorily. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5106(g) (2006) (defining “child abuse and neglect” as “at a 
minimum, any recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in death, 
serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation, or an act or failure to act which 
presents an imminent risk of serious harm”); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.290 (West 2019) (defining, in 
Alaska, “child abuse and neglect” as the physical or mental harming, neglect, sexual abuse, or maltreat-
ment of a person under the age of 18); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD. BU-
REAU, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2019), https:// 
www. childwelfare.gov/topics/systemwide/laws-policies/statutes/define/ [https://perma.cc/6NR3-
MWTQ] (providing an overview of state and federal laws defining child abuse). 
 Researchers supporting either concept suggest that the alienating parent sometimes takes drastic 
actions—destroying pictures of the non-alienating parent, blaming the non-alienating parent for finan-
cial problems, and encouraging conflict between the non-alienating parent and the child—that some 
consider psychological violence. LINDA J. GOTTLIEB, THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME: A 
FAMILY THERAPY AND COLLABORATIVE SYSTEMS APPROACH TO AMELIORATION 113–15 (2012) 
(describing the various behaviors that parental alienation syndrome alienators undertake according to 
the theory’s supporters); Varnado, supra note 13, at 120–22 (same). Although modern researchers still 
focus on the alienating parent, they do so with concern for the alienating parent as well as the child. 
See GOTTLIEB, supra, at 115 (noting that alienating parents too, are part of a family system that chil-
dren need). Moreover, modern proponents of parental alienation syndrome believe that alienating 
parents can and should be rehabilitated. See id. 
 Theorists propose that alienated parents, too, suffer because of alienation. See Ricky Finzi-Dottan 
et al., The Experience of Motherhood for Alienated Mothers, 17 CHILD & FAM. SOC. WORK 316, 321–
23 (2012) (highlighting the trauma mothers experience when they have been alienated from their 
children). The loss of a relationship with a child may result in a parent’s becoming overly aggressive 
or withdrawn in the pursuit of a relationship with the now-alienated child. Id. at 317 (noting that an 
alienated parent’s loss of contact with the child might exacerbate the alienation as mothers react in a 
variety of sometimes contradictory ways when contact with a child is lost). 
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theories into custody and divorce cases.25 Before examining the propriety of 
such testimony, however, it is first essential to understand parental alienation 
syndrome, its reformulation in parental alienation, and the reception each has 
received in the psychological community.26 It is also important to consider how 
both syndromes can enter family law cases in the first place.27 Section A of this 
Part discusses parental alienation syndrome.28 Section B then discusses the relat-
ed concept of parental alienation.29 Criticisms of both theories are highlighted in 
Section C.30 Section D then explains the mechanics of family court,31 and Sec-
tion E reviews the most common evidentiary standards for expert testimony.32 
A. Parental Alienation Syndrome 
The founder of parental alienation syndrome, Dr. Richard Gardner, de-
fined the syndrome as: 
[A] childhood disorder that arises almost exclusively in the context of 
child-custody disputes. Its primary manifestation is the child’s cam-
paign of denigration against a parent, a campaign that has no justifica-
tion. It results from the combination of a programming (brainwash-
ing) parent’s indoctrinations and the child’s own contributions to the 
vilification of the target parent.33 
He based this conclusion on his personal observations as a psychiatrist and, 
notably, not on scientific research.34 In numerous publications, Gardner stated, 
without evidence, that mothers feared that they were less likely to be guaran-
teed custody as family court litigation increased.35 As such, he suggested that 
women, in response to their anger, must have been doing something to ensure 
                                                                                                                           
 25 E.g., Gladwin v. Gilbert, No. D197102, 2001 Cal. SUPER. LEXIS 418, at *27 (Super. Ct. Feb. 
22, 2001) (modifying an existing custody after expert testimony alleging parental alienation). See 
generally Hanson v. Spolnik, 685 N.E.2d 71 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing parental alienation in 
the context of a divorce appeal). 
 26 See infra notes 33–89 and accompanying text (providing background information on parental 
alienation syndrome and parental alienation). 
 27 See infra notes 90–129 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 33–62 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 63–74 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 75–89 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 90–102 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 103–129 and accompanying text. 
 33 Gardner, supra note 5, at 95. 
 34 See GARDNER, supra note 14, at 1–2 (stating that his research was based on his own observa-
tions as a psychiatrist); Gardner, supra note 5, at 93–94 (citing only himself in his assertions of the 
causes of increased child custody litigation in the 1980s). 
 35 E.g., GARDNER, supra note 14, at 23; Richard A. Gardner, Denial of the Parental Alienation 
Syndrome Also Harms Women, 30 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 191, 192 (2002); Gardner, supra note 5, at 
93–94. 
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that they would not lose custody of their children.36 He then proposed that 
mothers induced parental alienation syndrome in their children.37 
Against the backdrop of increased child-custody litigation in the 1980s, 
Gardner characterized parental alienation syndrome based on what he observed 
as eight clusters of symptoms he saw in children involved in high-conflict custo-
dy disputes.38 These symptoms included: (1) “[a] campaign of denigration”; (2) 
silly reasons for the campaign of denigration; (3) strong feelings for the pre-
ferred parent; (4) “[t]he ‘independent-thinker’ phenomenon”; (5) an instinctive 
support of the alienating parent in the parental conflict; (6) an absence of guilt 
over cruelty to and or exploitation of the parent’; (7) “[t]he presence of ‘bor-
rowed scenarios’”; and (8) spreading “animosity to the friends and/or extended 
family of the alienated parent.”39 He used these eight symptoms to classify pa-
rental alienation syndrome as mild, medium, or severe.40 In milder cases of pa-
rental alienation syndrome, Gardner theorized that only some of the symptoms 
manifested in the child, whereas in more severe cases, the child manifested all 
of the eight clusters of symptoms.41 He identified the underlying cause of the 
syndrome as the programming behavior of the alienating parent.42 
                                                                                                                           
 36 Richard Gardner, The Parental Alienation Syndrome and the Corruptive Power of Anger, in 
THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME: CONCEPTUAL, CLINICAL 
AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 33, 35–36 (Richard Gardner et al. eds., 2006). Gardner suggested that 
both women and men induce parental alienation syndrome in their children to exert power over the 
other spouse, but his justifications of why they do this were much harsher for women than men. See 
id. at 36, 42. He proposed that women used parental alienation syndrome to harm their husbands be-
cause it was a socially acceptable way to “murder the husbands who abandoned them.” Id. at 36. Men, 
he said, used their social and financial power to release anger at wives who rejected them. Id. at 41. 
 37 Id. at 35–36. 
 38 Gardner, supra note 5, at 97. 
 39 Id. According to Gardner, when children engage in a campaign of denigration, they inexplica-
bly begin loathing and fearing the targeted parent. Amy J.L. Baker & Douglass C. Damall, A Con-
struct Study of the Eight Symptoms of Severe Parental Alienation Syndrome, 47 J. DIVORCE & RE-
MARRIAGE 55, 56 (2007). Children demonstrating the second of Gardner’s symptoms—silly reasons 
for denigration—will use simple or ridiculous justifications for the fear or anger they feel toward the 
non-alienating, targeted parent. Id. These children will be unable to say anything bad about the alien-
ating parent. Id. at 56–57. The “[i]ndependent [t]hinker” phenomenon is evidenced when a child in-
sists that the choice to denigrate the other parent is their own and not that of the alienating parent. Id. 
at 57. The alienated child will reflexively prefer the alienating parent, and the child will not feel bad 
about the denigration of the other parent. Id. Children suffering from parental alienation syndrome 
will also “borrow[] scenarios,” meaning that they use the language of the alienating parent when ac-
cusing the alienated parent. Id. Finally, parental alienation syndrome children, according to Gardner, 
generalize the irrational rejection of the alienated parent to those associated with the alienated parent. 
Id. 
 40 Baker & Damall, supra note 39, at 57. The classification of severity, according to Gardner, is 
contingent on the number of symptoms identified. Gardner, supra note 5, at 97. 
 41 Richard A. Gardner, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF PARENTAL ALIEN-
ATION SYNDROME, supra note 36, at 5, 9–10. 
 42 Gardner, supra note 5, at 97–98. 
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In his examination of the child’s level of alienation, Gardner considered 
the behavior of the alienating parent as an integral factor of the syndrome.43 
Alienating parents, Gardner posited, overprotect the child and scapegoat the 
other parent in order to induce parental alienation syndrome.44 This shifts the 
focus of the syndrome from exclusively pertaining to the child’s psychological 
state to also including the child’s relationship with the alienating parent.45 Un-
der Gardner’s theory, the source of the relational trouble comes from the alien-
ating parent, whom, Gardner suggested, is more frequently the mother.46 
Gardner suggested that mothers are more likely to alienate because, in his 
personal experience, women tend to be angrier than men in the face of di-
vorce.47 Anger, he believed, drives alienating behavior.48 He hypothesized that 
a parent’s anger is transposed onto the child so that the child comes to identify 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See Gardner, supra note 41, at 9 tbl.1.2 (identifying the parental factors that can contribute to 
parental alienation syndrome). These factors include assessments of numerous parental behaviors that 
allow for the categorization of the alienator’s symptom level, including the parent’s own mental 
health, complaints to law enforcement and child services, and the frequency of “programming 
thoughts,” “programming verbalizations,” and “exclusionary maneuvers.” Id. Gardner defined “exclu-
sionary maneuvers” as behaviors of the alienating parent that block the non-alienating parent’s access 
to the child and the child’s providers. Id. at 9 tbl.1.2 & n.2. 
 44 Gardner, supra note 36, at 38–39. In explaining the types of problematic parental behavior, 
Gardner points to the “diversionary maneuver” of the parent. Id. at 38. He suggests that both the 
mother and father may turn to alienation to redirect the child’s attention away from parental separation 
and toward the other parent. See generally id. at 34–42. He emphasizes that mothers, but notably not 
fathers, may engage in overprotection to begin alienating. See id. at 38–42. The alienating mother 
exerts her unwarranted concerns onto the child so that the child irrationally fears the father. Id. at 38–
39. Scapegoatism is another behavior that parents engage in to alienate their children. Id. at 39. This 
behavior involves blaming the other parent for problems that an alienating parent is experiencing. Id. 
Again, Gardner differentiates the scapegoating behavior of the mother and the father. Id. at 39–42. He 
suggests that a scapegoating mother does so over finances and material possessions, whereas the fa-
ther does so because of the emotional harm that he feels. Id. 
 45 See BERNET, supra note 7, at 4 (summarizing Gardner’s proposal that the difference between 
parental alienation syndrome and parental alienation is the involvement of the parent). 
 46 See Gardner, supra note 35, at 193–94 (emphasizing the role of the alienating parent in the 
development of parental alienation syndrome in the child and noting, without evidence, that the al-
ienator is almost exclusively the mother). But see Joan B. Kelly & Janet R. Johnston, The Alienated 
Child: A Reformulation of Parental Alienation Syndrome, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 249, 251 (2001) (propos-
ing an approach to parental alienation syndrome that focuses on the child’s behavior, and not on the 
alienating parent’s behavior). 
 47 See Gardner, supra note 36, at 34–35 (suggesting that fathers are more likely to find new part-
ners which is why they are less angry than mothers). 
 48 Id. at 34–35 (noting that parental alienation syndrome is one way in which women can express 
their anger at their partners or spouses). Gardner’s claims about the anger of the alienating parent are 
deeply gendered, and he offers no proof for his conclusions. See Meier, supra note 16, at 689 (sug-
gesting that parental alienation syndrome is used almost exclusively against mothers, despite the reali-
ty that fathers engage in what Gardner would consider an alienating behavior, especially in the context 
of an abusive marital relationship). In fact, in his discussion of the behavior of fathers as “alienators,” 
Gardner makes several controversial suppositions, including that women are more likely than men to 
be enraged after the dissolution of a marriage, and that women are more likely than men to fly into a 
jealous rage upon seeing their ex-spouse with a new partner. Gardner, supra note 36, at 41–42. 
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with that parent’s negative feelings toward the alienated parent—often the fa-
ther.49 The child’s anger, in turn, becomes a desire for the protection of the al-
ienator and a campaign of denigration against the non-alienating parent.50 As a 
consequence of this dynamic, Gardner suggested, children will launch false 
allegations of physical and sexual abuse against an innocent parent.51 
Gardner’s theory arose at a time when, he believed, the number of child-
custody disputes was increasing at a historic level.52 Without empirical evi-
dence, he proposed that, because women were afraid of losing the time they 
had with their children, they began programming their children to denigrate 
their fathers.53 His views originated in misconceived notions of divorcing 
mothers as angry “scorned women.”54 This stereotype, beyond being offensive 
to women and mothers, has no foundation in data or science.55 Consequently, 
recent approaches to parental alienation syndrome have sought to separate the 
theory from Gardner’s gendered approach.56 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See Gardner, supra note 36, at 44–45 (suggesting that, because of the alienating parent’s be-
havior, the child will manifest the same anger toward the non-alienating parent). 
 50 Id. at 45–46 (arguing that the alienating parent can convince a child that they are in dangerous 
situations when the non-alienating parent is near). This proposition led Gardner to hypothesize that 
child abuse accusations are far less common than statistics suggest, because children have been “pro-
grammed” to target the non-alienating parent with false accusations to affect court proceedings. Id. at 
44. See generally GARDNER, supra note 14 (proposing that child sexual abuse is overblown and over-
identified). 
 51 GARDNER, supra note 14, at 3–4 (positing that, particularly in the context of a custody dispute, 
sex abuse allegations are likely to be false). The premise that mothers are more likely to alienate their 
children than fathers garnered staunch criticism from feminists and strong support from fathers’ rights 
organizations. Compare Meier, supra note 16, at 659 (critiquing Gardner’s theory from a feminist lens 
because of its gendered assertions), with Katie Davis, Parental Alienation & Its Impact on Fathers, 
MEN’S RTS., https://mensrights.com/parental-alienation-its-impact-on-fathers/ [https://perma.cc/M463-
LLC8] (criticizing those who question parental alienation by stating, without proof, that “[m]any psy-
chologists and law professors now consider this type of alienation . . . to be a condition”). 
 52 Gardner, supra note 41, at 5. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Gardner, supra note 36, at 35–36 (referencing the term “malicious mother syndrome” to char-
acterize mothers inducing parental alienation syndrome in their children to highlight the idea that 
women seek to ruin their ex-spouses by using their children). 
 55 See generally id. (referencing several of Gardner’s own works and only three others to support 
his conclusions). 
 56 See GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at xi (illustrating that Gardner’s initial approach to parental al-
ienation syndrome made women the exclusive perpetrators). Professionals in the field have now ex-
plicitly clarified, based on their own limited data, that fathers are just as likely as mothers to engage in 
alienating behavior toward their children. Id. (suggesting that parental alienation syndrome is an “op-
portunistic” syndrome, and not one that is inherently dependent on gender). 
 Despite the credit that modern theorists give to Gardner for first labelling and diagnosing parental 
alienation syndrome, psychologists who recognize it as a legitimate syndrome are still critical of his 
methodology and theoretical framework. See, e.g., Kelly & Johnston, supra note 46, at 249–50 (offer-
ing a reformulation of parental alienation syndrome because of Gardner’s controversial propositions). 
Some modern theorists now use the term parental alienation disorder to refer to a child with parental 
alienation who manifests some or all of Gardner’s eight characteristic behaviors. BERNET, supra note 
7, at 4. Those who proposed a change to the newest version of the DSM referred to parental alienation 
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Modern definitions of parental alienation syndrome reflect aspects of 
Gardner’s original theory, but differ on some important points.57 First, those 
studying parental alienation syndrome now reject Gardner’s theory that a 
mother is more likely to alienate than a father.58 In fact, modern research indi-
cates that mothers are no more likely than fathers to alienate their children.59 
Theorists also focus their modelling on the well-known family systems model of 
the social sciences, by which mental health professionals understand the individ-
ual in the context of the family.60 Additionally, parental alienation syndrome the-
orists now focus their attention on the behavior of the child and less on the be-
havior of the alienating parent.61 This reflects the changing standards of the so-
cial sciences, as the fields of social work and psychology have begun responding 
to the critiques that historical theories and models stigmatize women.62 
                                                                                                                           
disorder instead of parental alienation syndrome to reflect the structure of the then-in progress DSM-5. 
Id. at 5. 
 The DSM has been updated numerous times since its inception in 1952. AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, FROM PLANNING TO PUBLICATION: DEVELOPING DSM-5, at 1 (2013), https://www.psychiatry.
org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM-Development-of-DSM-5.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LBE4-XHWZ]. The APA began working on the DSM-5 in 1999 and examined issues with 
the previous version of the DSM—the DSM Fourth Edition (DSM-IV)—with respect to gender, cul-
ture, and changes across the lifespan. Id. Over the next thirteen years, the drafters of the DSM-5 col-
laborated with mental health professionals to propose diagnostic criteria with the input from experts 
with diverse perspectives in a variety of specialized fields. Id. at 1–3. The APA approved the DSM-5 
in December 2012. Id. at 3. 
 57 BERNET, supra note 7, at app. A (defining the diagnostic criteria for parental alienation disorder 
as a proposal submitted to the APA). The definition of parental alienation disorder is more nuanced 
than Gardner’s proposed parental alienation syndrome as it specifies a duration of the symptoms and 
requires that the disturbance cause “clinically significant distress or impairment.” Id. 
 58 GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at xi. 
 59 E.g., id. 
 60 Id. at 10–11 (describing parental alienation syndrome as an extreme form of the family systems 
concept of triangulation). Under the theory developed by Salvador Minuchin, the famed family thera-
pist who spearheaded family systems theory, dysfunctional relationships and communication “triads” 
often manifest in behavioral problems of the child. SALVADOR MINUCHIN, FAMILIES AND FAMILY 
THERAPY 89–102 (1974) (defining triangulation as a communication pattern in which both parents try 
to ally the child with themselves instead of with the other parent). 
 61 See Kelly & Johnston, supra note 46, at 251 (proposing a model that focuses on the child, not 
the alienating parent); see also GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 57 (highlighting the behavior of the chil-
dren suffering from parental alienation syndrome as that of children with a “laundry list of vague 
injustices . . . which were allegedly inflicted upon them by their targeted parent”). Linda Gottlieb, a 
Licensed Clinical Social Worker and staunch defender of parental alienation syndrome, is cautious in 
her characterization of the alienating parent, noting that parents effectuating the syndrome might not 
be doing so intentionally. Id. at 114. 
 62 See GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at xi–xii (stating that the author does not believe in the proposi-
tion that women are more likely to partake in alienating behavior because of gender). In fact, Gottlieb 
discussed that even Gardner revised his belief about women’s tendency to alienate. Id. at xi. 
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B. Parental Alienation 
Despite the modernization of parental alienation syndrome, some re-
searchers support the phenomenon of parental alienation without advocating 
for its place as an actual syndrome.63 They argue that parental alienation can-
not be considered a syndrome because, unlike other syndromes, it is not a 
problem of individual development.64 Rather, parental alienation is inherently 
a relationship issue.65 As such, many mental health professionals and research-
ers distinguish between parental alienation syndrome and parental alienation 
by suggesting that parental alienation is a more modern formulation of the 
original syndrome.66 
A more commonly accepted definition of parental alienation focuses on 
the alienated child instead of on the behavior of the parent.67 Under this more 
modern formulation, parental alienation exists when the alienated child ex-
presses unreasonably negative feelings toward a parent that are disproportion-
ate to the actual experience.68 These children are found to respond in a “pho-
bic-like” manner to the non-alienating parent.69 The model builds on the be-
                                                                                                                           
 63 See, e.g., JANET JOHNSTON ET AL., IN THE NAME OF THE CHILD: A DEVELOPMENTAL AP-
PROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AND HELPING CHILDREN OF CONFLICTED AND VIOLENT DIVORCE 362 
(2d ed. 2009) (suggesting that parental alienation syndrome focuses too much on the alienating parent 
and not enough on the child); Kelly & Johnston, supra note 46, at 249–50 (providing several reasons 
that parental alienation syndrome should be reformulated as parental alienation). 
 64 Kelly & Johnston, supra note 46, at 251. Critics indicate that parental alienation cannot be 
considered a “syndrome” under the definition common to psychiatric nomenclature of a syndrome. 
JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 363 (arguing that parental alienation cannot be a syndrome be-
cause there are not any “commonly recognized, or empirically verified pathogenesis, course, familial 
pattern, or treatment selection for the condition”). Per the DSM-5, a syndrome is “[a] grouping of 
signs and symptoms, based on their frequent co-occurrence that may suggest a common underlying 
pathogenesis, course, familial pattern, or treatment selection.” DSM-5, supra note 13, at 830. Critics 
that advocate for parental alienation but not for its status as a syndrome suggest that it does not have a 
unique cause, set of symptoms, pattern of family dynamics, or accepted treatment modality associated 
with it and thus does not warrant being labeled a syndrome. JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 363. 
 65 JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 363 (proposing that the parent is not always the cause of a 
child’s parental alienation). 
 66 E.g., BERNET, supra note 7, at 4–5 (distinguishing between parental alienation—a more general 
diagnosis—and parental alienation syndrome, a specific subset of parental alienation). Some, includ-
ing Gardner, see parental alienation as a coexisting and sometimes complementary concept. Id. at 5. 
Others criticize parental alienation syndrome while recognizing the validity of parental alienation. 
E.g., JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 363. 
 67 Kelly & Johnston, supra note 46, at 251 (“This formulation proposes to focus on the alienated 
child rather than on parental alienation.”). Not all researchers accept Kelly and Johnston’s criticisms. 
GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 7–11 (critiquing Kelly and Johnston’s theory of parental alienation for, 
what Gottlieb identifies as, vague assertions and inconsistent conclusions). 
 68 Kelly & Johnston, supra note 46, at 251. 
 69 JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 363–64 (explaining, under the Kelly and Johnston model, 
that alienating children respond to the “fear[ed]” parent by rejecting without ambivalence). 
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havioral characteristics proposed by Gardner but departs from evaluating the 
conduct and motivations of the so-called alienating parent.70 
Using this model, a variety of factors can be found to contribute to the al-
ienation, outside of the behavior of the parent.71 These factors include highly 
contentious marriages, embarrassing custody proceedings, the psychological 
predisposition of the parents, the child’s age, cognitive abilities and tempera-
ment, the role of siblings, new parental partners, and the relationships with 
extended family members.72 The family law proceedings themselves can lead 
to concerning behavior when children come to view court officers, judges, and 
psychologists as enemies or as friends.73 This newer model, although more 
widely accepted in the social science communities than the original parental 
alienation syndrome, is still not without its criticisms.74 
C. Criticisms of Parental Alienation and Parental Alienation Syndrome 
Despite the stronger support of this newer theory of parental alienation, 
other mental health professionals remain opposed to the concept.75 This is 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 367. This model of parental alienation is careful to distinguish normal preferences, 
alignments, and estrangement—all of which are, to a certain extent, normal in the context of a di-
vorce—from alienation. Id. at 364–67. According to some theorists, drawing this distinction is im-
portant when designing therapeutic interventions for children. Id. at 366. 
 72 Id. at 367. Children are also more likely to become alienated when they have witnessed a sub-
stantial amount of marital conflict. Id. 
 73 Id. Furthermore, vulnerable children tend to be more susceptible when they are eight to fifteen 
years old, particularly because they are easily pressured. Id. at 369. The parent with whom the child 
aligns often has narcissistic tendencies and feels that the divorce and custody process is particularly 
embarrassing. Id. at 367. Alienating parents, especially those who batter, use children as tools for 
revenge. Id. at 368. 
 Another modern definition of parental alienation is parental alienation disorder, proposed to the 
APA for inclusion in the DSM-5. BERNET, supra note 7, at 5. In his proposal, Dr. William Bernet 
provided twenty reasons that the disorder should be included in the DSM-5. Id. at 9–10. Chief among 
them was that parental alienation is a concept that has been recognized as valid by at least six re-
searchers. Id. In defending the validity of the diagnosis, Bernet explained that the phenomenon of 
parental alienation was described even prior to Gardner’s work. Id. at 9. He also noted that parental 
alienation is conceptually valid because: (1) it has been thoroughly researched; (2) it has been de-
scribed by different groups of researchers; (3) researchers have applied it to their own clients and 
patients; (4) it has been studied in different countries; (5) it is highly accepted by mental health pro-
fessionals who work with children in contentious divorces; and (6) other research on related topics 
suggests the existence of parental alienation. Id. at 24–96. Furthermore, Bernet suggested that the 
diagnosis has been found to be reliable. Id. at 91–96. 
 74 See Lenore E. Walker & David L. Shapiro, Parental Alienation Disorder: Why Label Children 
with a Mental Diagnosis?, 7 J. CHILD CUSTODY 266, 267–68 (2010) (critiquing parental alienation 
disorder for its lack of scientific data); infra notes 75–89 and accompanying text. 
 75 Walker & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 267–68. Dr. Lenore Walker is a clinical psychologist who 
is known for her work in the domestic violence field. About Dr. Lenore E. Walker, DR. LENORE E. 
WALKER, https://www.drlenoreewalker.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/9K4P-PJZN]. Her article critiqu-
ing parental alienation disorder, co-written with law professor David L. Shapiro, highlights the psy-
chological impacts of mislabeling children with an unnecessary and inappropriate diagnosis. Walker 
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largely due to the absence of empirical studies on unjustified parental rejec-
tion.76 Some claim that, after examining the literature surrounding parental 
alienation syndrome and parental alienation, neither is valid because no peer-
reviewed journals have published studies on either theory.77 The few studies 
that do exist contain too few study participants, and thus, critics suggest, there 
is no proof that parental alienation should be an accepted diagnosis.78 Critics 
also highlight the definitional problems in the proposed diagnoses; proponents 
insist that the rejection takes place without any “rational” justification, but they 
fail to define what a “rational” justification for the child’s rejection might be.79 
A related problem is that literature on parental alienation contains no definition 
of what precisely constitutes domestic violence, making it difficult to distin-
guish between rejection that might be justified—rejecting an abusive parent—
and rejection that is unjustified under theories of parental alienation.80 Fur-
thermore, application of parental alienation syndrome and parental alienation 
may unnecessarily label a child with a mental disorder, when that child may 
simply be having a natural reaction to a contentious divorce.81 
                                                                                                                           
& Shapiro, supra note 74, at 266. She also explains the difficulty practitioners will have in making a 
differential diagnosis. Id. at 276–79. For mental health practitioners, differential diagnosis is an im-
portant step in identifying the appropriate diagnosis for an individual and distinguishing that diagnosis 
from “possible competing diagnoses.” Chad E. Cook & Simon Décary, Higher Order Thinking About 
Differential Diagnosis, 24 BRAZILIAN J. PHYSICAL THERAPY 1, 1 (2020) (defining differential diag-
nosis). 
 76 Timothy M. Houchin et al., The Parental Alienation Debate Belongs in the Courtroom, Not in 
DSM-5, 40 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 127, 129 (2012) (indicating that studies done on parental 
alienation syndrome are limited and do not lend themselves well to statistically significant conclu-
sions). 
 77 Id. at 129–30. For example, Gardner published his own works instead of submitting them to 
respected, peer-reviewed journals for publication. Id. at 130. 
 78 Id. at 129–30. 
 79 Walker & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 270. The “rational[ity]” remains totally subjective to the 
evaluator, and thus makes it particularly difficult to identify or study empirically. Id. at 270–71. 
 80 See id. at 272 (questioning how much abuse is needed before the domestic violence becomes 
“real” enough to warrant parental rejection). State and federal legislatures define “domestic violence” 
differently. See, e.g., 34 U.S.C. § 12291(a)(8) (defining domestic violence as a felony or misdemeanor 
committed by the victim’s intimate partner); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (2020) (defining domestic 
violence as an attempt to physically harm or actually physically harming someone with whom the 
perpetrator has a personal relationship, or threatening to harm that person in a way that causes the 
victim to feel “substantial emotional distress”). North Carolina defines a “personal relationship” as 
one with the opposite sex, ruling out the possibility of domestic violence between homosexual part-
ners. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1(b)(6) (2020). Domestic violence advocates propose a definition of 
domestic violence that is much broader than statutory definitions. E.g., Abuse Defined, NAT’L DO-
MESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, https://www.thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/abuse-defined/ [https://
perma.cc/P6CE-K3C3] (defining domestic violence as behavior used by an intimate partner to main-
tain power and control over the victim). Unlike the North Carolina statute, the National Domestic 
Violence Hotline definition makes it clear that anyone can be defined as a victim, regardless of sexu-
ality. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1, with Abuse Defined, supra. 
 81 Walker & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 268–69. Critics also suggest that inclusion of a parental 
alienation theory in the DSM-5 would create a problem where there is none. Id. at 269 (pointing out 
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Perhaps the most resounding rejection by the scientific community of 
both theories came from the APA.82 In 2013, the APA Board of Trustees an-
nounced it once again would exclude parental alienation syndrome from the 
latest version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Diseases, the 
DSM-5.83 Instead, the APA added an issue similar to parental alienation that 
clinicians may see in their work: the Parent-Child Relational Problem.84 This 
category of behavioral problem exists when there are relationship issues be-
tween the child and the parent, but it is importantly not a psychological disor-
der, according to the APA.85 
Outside of the scientific community, feminist researchers and domestic vio-
lence advocates are also particularly critical of parental alienation syndrome and 
parental alienation.86 According to feminist researchers and domestic violence 
advocates, the theories come from a troubled past, and largely impact women 
and children because they can, and have been, applied in an inappropriately gen-
                                                                                                                           
that inclusion of parental alienation disorder in the DSM may “reif[y]” it instead of clarifying it). 
Those who advocated for the concepts’ inclusion in the DSM-5 believed that clarifying the criteria for 
the disorder would bring more data to the diagnosis. Id. at 279–80 (referencing the proposition of 
BERNET, supra note 7, that inclusion in the DSM-5 could generate the requisite data to justify the 
disorder). That data, though, could be used to confirm the beliefs of alienation proponents without 
appropriately justifying the disorder itself. Id. at 280 (“[I]f the diagnostic category is put in the [DSM-
5] to encourage gathering the necessary data, it may be used to justify the use of an otherwise insuffi-
cient diagnosis.”). 
 82 See APA Board of Trustees Approves DSM-5, supra note 6 (announcing in a press release that 
parental alienation syndrome would not be included in the DSM-5). 
 83 Id. 
 84 DSM-5, supra note 13, at 715, 875. 
 85 Id. at 875. The Parent-Child Relational Problem can become evident to a clinician as the pre-
senting problem requiring treatment or in the context of treatment of another mental health disorder. 
Id. The problem is often associated with poor functioning in the behavioral, cognitive, and affective 
domains. Id. Proponents of parental alienation disorder appreciate that relational problems have been 
included in DSM-5; they suggest, however, that parental alienation disorder and parent-child relational 
problems are not synonymous. BERNET, supra note 7, at 12–13. Bernet distinguishes between the two 
by illustrating that parental alienation disorder is more persistent and severe than more general parent-
child relational problems. Id. at app. A (defining parent-child relational problem and parental aliena-
tion disorder). 
 86 E.g., Meier, supra note 16, at 679–80; see BERNET, supra note 7, at 271–75 (explaining the 
criticism that parental alienation draws from feminists and domestic violence advocates). Domestic 
violence advocates and researchers are not opposed to all new mental disorders, though. See, e.g., 
Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome: Empirical Findings, 1087 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. 
SCIS. 142, 143 (2006) [hereinafter Walker, Empirical Findings] (explaining how feminists and domes-
tic violence advocates adapted battered woman syndrome soon after its proposal). For example, bat-
tered woman syndrome, proposed a few years after parental alienation, gained acceptance in the psy-
chological community relatively quickly, as elements of the disorder appeared in the definition of 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in the precursor to the DSM-5, the DSM Fourth Edition Text 
Revision (DSM-IV-TR), as well as the DSM-5. Lenore E. Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome, PSY-
CHIATRIC TIMES (July 8, 2009), https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/view/battered-woman-syndrome 
[https://perma.cc/SX82-WSHD] [hereinafter Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome] (providing an over-
view of the DSM-IV-TR’s acceptance of battered woman syndrome as a subcategory of PTSD); see 
DSM-5, supra note 13, at 274 (acknowledging the importance of gender when examining PTSD). 
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dered way.87 These researchers argue that parental alienation as a mental disor-
der does not exist.88 Instead, they suggest that parental alienation is a tool used 
by batterers and child abusers in court to defend their abusive behavior.89 
D. An Overview of Family Law: Explaining the Most  
Common Child Custody Standards 
When a couple ends their relationship—through divorce or separation—
the parties, many of whom are unrepresented, often fight bitterly over child 
custody in the family court.90 It is in this context that parents may raise paren-
tal alienation.91 
In every case involving children, judges must make formal court orders 
and decisions regarding custody arrangements.92 Most frequently, judges will 
order one of two custody arrangements: sole custody or joint custody.93 An 
order of joint custody is a more recent phenomenon in which children split 
their time by living evenly, more or less, with both parents.94 Judges can also 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See Meier, supra note 16, at 679–80. 
 88 Id. at 671. 
 89 Id. at 679–80; see Jennifer Baker, Parental Alienation Syndrome: Calling Moms Nazis, PSYCH. 
TODAY (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-love-wisdom/201608/
parental-alienation-syndrome-calling-moms-nazis [https://perma.cc/VLU2-XYDN] (calling parental 
alienation syndrome “domestic violence by proxy”); Marisa Endicott, How Parental Alienation Syn-
drome Is Changing Custody Cases Across the U.S., HUFFINGTON POST (June 9, 2017), https://www.
huffpost.com/entry/how-parental-alienation-syndrome-is-changing-custody_b_5939d367e4b094
fa859f1719 [https://perma.cc/J4EB-PHNK] (reporting that parental alienation can be used as a handy 
tool for batterers to use to continue to abuse a child).  
 90 JUDITH AREEN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 768 (6th ed. 2012). 
 91 Id. When two parties share a child, regardless of their marital status, both parties have rights 
and responsibilities with respect to that child. E.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 202 (NAT’L CONF. OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE . L. 2017) (proposing that states adopt language granting the same rights to 
unmarried and married parents). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
also called the Uniform Law Commission, is a non-partisan organization that provides sample uni-
form laws for states to enact. About Us, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/
aboutulc/overview [https://perma.cc/44ZS-C452]. 
 92 KATHARINE K. BAKER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, ESSENTIALS: FAMILY LAW 159 (2009). 
 93 Jay Folberg et al., § 13.04 Recognized Forms of Custody, in 2 CHILD CUSTODY & VISITATION 
(rev. ed. 2019) (explaining four permissible kinds of custody, but specifying that split custody and 
divided custody are more uncommon). 
 94 BAKER & SILBAUGH, supra note 92, at 164–65 (defining joint custody as an arrangement that 
requires sharing responsibility of the children). In seeking to establish more equality in the sexes’ 
responsibilities and rights with respect to their children, judges began ordering joint custody. Id. Alt-
hough this is seemingly better for both parents, it is unclear if joint custody is healthy for children. Id. 
at 163. To address this concern, some courts have ordered “birds nest” co-parenting arrangements in 
which the child remains in the home and the parents cycle in and out of the home. Edward Kruk, 
“Bird’s Nest” Co-parenting Arrangements, PSYCH. TODAY (July 16, 2013), https://www.psychology
today.com/us/blog/co-parenting-after-divorce/201307/birds-nest-co-parenting-arrangements [https://
perma.cc/ZNU4-KCZU]. Though inconvenient for the adults, it is a more child-centered way to deal 
with joint custody and places the needs of the children at the forefront. Id.; see BAKER & SILBAUGH, 
supra note 92, at 163. 
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order sole custody with parenting time or visitation.95 The child in this circum-
stance lives primarily with one parent and has periodic scheduled visits with 
the other.96 
Judges tend to determine the amount of visitation with the “best interest 
of the child” as the guiding standard.97 Although the standard is extremely 
flexible as applied, it requires judges to consider the needs and interests of the 
child when determining custody.98 Factors that speak to a child’s needs and 
                                                                                                                           
 95 BAKER & SILBAUGH, supra note 92, at 171. A judge may also order sole custody with no visit-
ation, whereby a child lives with one parent, and the other parent has no legal right to see that child. 
Id. at 164–65. In families where one parent has alleged domestic violence, the alleged abuser is not 
inherently precluded from having joint custody if it is in the best interest of the child. Id. at 165. 
 96 Id. at 171. 
 97 See Hollon v. Hollon, No. 2000-CA-00141-SCT (¶ 35) (Miss. 2001) (listing a variety of factors 
that should be considered to determine what custody arrangement is in the best interest of the child); 
AREEN ET AL., supra note 90, at 768. These factors can include, but are not limited to, the child’s age, 
sex, gender, and preferences, the parents’ preferences, the quality of the relationship that the child has 
with each parent, and the presence of domestic violence. See, e.g., Hollon, No. 2000-CA-00141-SCT 
(¶ 12) (quoting Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983)). Different states define 
“best interest of the child” with differing levels of specificity. Compare, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-914 
(2020) (listing seventeen factors that courts should consider in determining custody “in the best inter-
est of the child”), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208 § 18 (2020) (declining to explicitly mention the 
“best interest of the child”). 
 98 BAKER & SILBAUGH, supra note 92, at 160. Though the “best interest of the child” is the domi-
nating standard in modern family courts across the United States, some states use alternative ap-
proaches to determine child custody. Id. (providing an overview of the historical development of the 
best interest of the child standard). In the 1960s, courts frequently granted custody to the mother under 
the “tender years” presumption, reflecting a gendered judicial bias that the mother was inherently the 
better parent because of her maternal instincts. See Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120–21 (Utah 1986) 
(articulating reasons to reject the tender-years presumption, and instead arguing for one that looks to 
“function-related factors”). Courts have also justified custody orders through the “primary caretaker” 
presumption, which requires the judge to order custody to the person who is the primary caretaker of 
the children. See, e.g., Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362–63 (W.Va. 1981) (stating that custody 
in West Virginia is presumed to go to the primary caretaker of the child, regardless of that caretaker’s 
gender). 
 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act articulates an example best interest of the child standard: 
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child. The 
court shall consider all relevant factors including: 
 (1) the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his custody; 
 (2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian; 
 (3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his 
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest; 
 (4) the child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community; and 
 (5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved. 
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his re-
lationship to the child. 
UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1974). This 
language highlights the importance of looking at a variety of factors when determining what is truly in 
the child’s best interest. Id. § 402 cmt. 
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interests include the age of the child, the emotional ties that child has with a 
parent, and the preference of the child.99 
Once a judge orders a custody arrangement, the judge is obligated to 
reevaluate the custody arrangement upon request of either of the parties to en-
sure the arrangement is still in the best interest of the child.100 Oftentimes, to 
induce a judge to reevaluate a custody arrangement, one parent may claim pa-
rental alienation is occurring in the home of the other parent.101 Subsequent 
changes in custody, however, can endanger and traumatize children.102 
E. Experts on Family: How Judges Use Expert Testimony in the Courtroom 
Because family courts deal with so many legal issues, ranging from di-
vorce to custody to property division, the parties or the judge may request ex-
pert testimony to assist the judge in fact-finding.103 In the context of a child 
custody dispute, judges or the parties most frequently request a mental health 
professional to weigh in on what custody arrangement will really be in the best 
interest of the child.104 
                                                                                                                           
 99 See, e.g., Hollon, No. 2000-CA-00141-SCT (¶ 35) (annunciating eleven different factors that 
Mississippi courts must balance in custody cases) (“The polestar consideration in child custody cases 
is the best interest and welfare of the child.”). Not all states require judges to consider domestic vio-
lence when determining the best interest of the child. See In re Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d 434, 439–440 
(Mass. 1996), aff’g R.H. v. B.F., 653 N.E.2d 195 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (mandating, for the first time 
in Massachusetts, that a trial court explicitly consider domestic violence in the context of a child cus-
tody case). 
 100 BAKER & SILBAUGH, supra note 92, at 167 (outlining the amorphous nature of the best interest 
of the child standard). 
 101 M.A. v. A.I., No. A-4021-11T1, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2887, at *5 (Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Dec. 15, 2014) (ordering an immediate modification of custody to address the judge’s concerns 
of parental alienation syndrome). M.A. v. A.I. is the appeal of the Ionescu case examined in the pod-
cast, Reveal, by the Center for Investigative Reporting. Id.; Reveal, Bitter Custody, supra note 1 (nar-
rating the facts of the Ionescu case from the perspective of Ana Ionescu). In M.A. v. A.I., the plaintiff 
mother alleged that the defendant father, who had physical custody of the two children, was alienating 
them. 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2887, at *4. Following this allegation and expert testimony on 
the matter, the judge ordered that the children attend a rehabilitation program with their mother, the 
parent they had accused of abuse. Id. 
 102 See R.H. v. B.H., 653 N.E.2d 195, 202 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (explaining that granting child 
custody to a potential batterer can put that child’s safety at risk). Another young woman interviewed 
for Reveal’s Bitter Custody story, Melanie Cole, says that her mother abused her but that the judge 
ordered custody to her mother because of the parental alienation defense. Reveal, Bitter Custody, 
supra note 1. Melanie reported that her mother’s abuse made her suicidal and said that she had experi-
enced deep emotional trauma because of the change in custody. Id. Studies show that conflict between 
parents is associated with poor mental health outcomes for children, and that such conflict increases 
during the separation and divorce processes. Irwin Sandler et al., Effects of Father and Mother Parent-
ing on Children’s Mental Health in High- and Low-Conflict Divorces, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 282, 284 
(2008). 
 103 AREEN ET AL., supra note 90, at 1–4. 
 104 BAKER & SILBAUGH, supra note 92, at 166 (stating that courts appoint guardians ad litem 
(GAL) and mental health professionals to help make custody decisions). 
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Such experts will generally interview the parties and the child when mak-
ing their evaluations.105 Experts employed by the court, such as guardians ad 
litem, will likewise observe the parties’ interactions with the child and may 
also interview third parties such as the child’s teachers or health care provid-
ers.106 After making their observations, experts may then write a report.107 Ei-
ther party can request before trial that this expert be allowed to testify.108 Upon 
an objection from one party declaring expert testimony inadmissible, the judge 
must examine the theoretical framework underlying the expert’s conclusions to 
ensure that the science employed is sound.109 
Judges are not themselves experts on psychological concepts, so they fre-
quently welcome expert testimony into the courtroom to explain parental al-
ienation syndrome and parental alienation.110 Procedural rules and state com-
mon law govern the standard for the admission of expert testimony.111 Most 
states follow one of two standards—the Frye v. United States test of general 
acceptance or the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. multifactorial 
test—though some states articulate their own rules for the admission of expert 
                                                                                                                           
 105 Am. Psych. Ass’n, Guidelines for Custody Evaluations in Family Court Proceedings, 65 AM. 
PSYCH. 863, 866 (2010) (enumerating best practices for psychologists participating as experts in fami-
ly court proceedings). The guidelines articulated by the APA are a list of principles; they do not in-
clude specific requirements of how psychologists adhere to the guidelines so long as they behave in 
accordance with the Association’s code of ethics. Id. at 863. 
 106 Id. at 865. A GAL is a court appointed attorney who investigates the best interest of the child. 
See, e.g., Roxanne Mennes, Introduction to Service as a Family Law GAL, in WASH. STATE ADMIN. 
OFF. OF THE CTS., WASHINGTON STATE TITLE 26 FAMILY LAW GUARDIAN AD LITEM GUIDEBOOK 2, 
2 (2008), http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/manuals/domviol/appendixe.pdf [https://perma.cc/3M6Q-
D8BD] (outlining GAL procedures in Washington). A GAL is supposed to represent the interest of the 
child, not of the parents, and theoretically receives extensive training on the needs of children. Id. 
Involving a GAL does require payment from the parties, so lower-income families may avoid the 
appointment to avoid the associated costs. See NW. JUST. PROJECT, YOUR FAMILY LAW CASE: IF YOU 
CANNOT AFFORD THE GAL FEE 1 (2016), https://www.washingtonlawhelp.org/files/C9D2EA3F-
0350-D9AF-ACAE-BF37E9BC9FFA/attachments/C6B477EA-2DB6-42F7-8C89-1E393702224F/
3117en_cannot-afford-gal-fee.pdf [https://perma.cc/UB66-KWF5] (explaining the options available in 
Washington if a party cannot afford the $1,000-to-$3,000 GAL fee). 
 107 Am. Psych. Ass’n, supra note 105, at 867; see What You Need to Know About Child Custody 
Evaluations, OUR FAM. WIZARD: BLOG, https://www.ourfamilywizard.com/blog/child-custody-eval
uation [https://perma.cc/2KJ7-E6CY] (explaining the custody evaluation process for parents in the 
family court system). 
 108 See, e.g., ARIZ. R. FAM. L. P. 49(j) (2020) (requiring the disclosure of expert witnesses to the 
other party prior to trial); MASS. R. DOMESTIC RELS. P. 26 (2020) (describing the procedure for using 
expert witnesses at trial). 
 109 John E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REV. 1, 
23 (1989) (explaining that either party or the judge can call an expert’s reliability into question). 
 110 BAKER & SILBAUGH, supra note 92, at 4. 
 111 Id. at 15–17 (listing the different sources for family law in general). See generally MAT-
THIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ALL 50 STATES 
(2021) (articulating the evidentiary origins of expert testimony in each state). 
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testimony.112 Subsection 1 provides an explanation of the Frye test for the ad-
missibility,113 and subsection 2 highlights the Daubert multi-factorial test.114 
                                                                                                                           
 112 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993) (articulating the Daubert 
test); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (establishing the Frye test). See gen-
erally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2203 (2020) (applying Daubert), invalidated by Lear v. Fields, 
245 P.3d 911 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999) (applying Daubert), 
abrogated by State v. Sharpe, 435 P.3d 887 (Alaska 2019); Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 
N.E.2d 314 (Ill. 2002) (applying Frye), abrogated by In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184 
(2004); Alsheik v. Guerrero (Alsheik I), 956 N.E.2d 1115 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting adaptation of 
any test), rev’d on other grounds, 979 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. 2012). The Daubert test has been expanded to 
include non-scientific evidence. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 138 (1999) (hold-
ing that the Daubert factors can also be applied to non-scientific expert testimony like that of an engi-
neer). 
 Although the Daubert and Frye approaches to expert testimony are certainly the most common, 
some states have chosen to develop their own standards for the admission of expert testimony. E.g., 
Alsheik I, 956 N.E.2d at 1127 (stating that there is no particular standard for the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony); Searles v. Fleetwood Homes of Pa., Inc., 2005 ME 94, ¶¶ 17–29, 878 A.2d 509, 515–
18 (providing an overview of the test that Maine uses to determine the admissibility of expert testimo-
ny); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 772 (Minn. 1980) (generating a two-part test that modifies the 
Frye test in Minnesota). Minnesota stands out by adhering to its own Frye-Mack test. Zach Alter, 
Note, Unpacking Frye-Mack: A Critical Analysis of Minnesota’s Frye-Mack Standard for Admitting 
Scientific Evidence, 43 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 626, 627–28 (2017) (differentiating Minnesota 
from the majority of states that are using Daubert). In 1980 in State v. Mack, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court was faced with a question regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. 292 N.W.2d at 765–
66. The court decided that expert testimony based on hypnotically refreshed memories was inadmissi-
ble under Minnesota law. Id. The court decided to exclude the testimony about hypnosis under Frye, 
but added an additional threshold: the proposed testimony must meet “ordinary standards of reliability 
for admission.” Id. at 772. In Minnesota, then, evidence must: (1) be generally accepted in its relevant 
scientific community and (2) have foundational reliability. See State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 97–98 
(Minn. 1990) (applying the Frye-Mack test to blood splatter analysis). Foundational reliability re-
quires the party offering the scientific evidence to prove that the theoretical basis is reliable and has 
conformed in a reliable way, in the context of the particular case. Id. at 98 (opining that foundational 
reliability is a crucial aspect of the Frye-Mack test); see also Alter, supra, at 659. Minnesota courts 
have further required parties to show that the expert’s conclusion applies to the facts of the case at 
hand. Alter, supra, at 660 (suggesting, based on an overview of Minnesota cases, that parties in Min-
nesota have a high burden to demonstrate foundational reliability). 
 By creating its own standard, Minnesota judges follow a more objective rule. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 
615 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000) (highlighting the potential for a lack of uniformity in lower court 
decisions). Minnesota addressed the concern that Frye was too restrictive by generating the Frye-
Mack test. Id. (highlighting the Minnesota Supreme Court’s concern that Daubert allows judges to 
have too much discretion in their gatekeeping functions). The Minnesota Supreme Court was con-
cerned, when it decided Goeb v. Tharaldson in 2000, that Daubert would result in too many incon-
sistent rulings; thus, it upheld the Frye-Mack standard. Id. The codification of the Frye-Mack test in 
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 also represents a compromise between Frye and Daubert because it 
blends general acceptance with reliability. Alter, supra, at 662 (suggesting that the modern Frye-Mack 
standard is a move away from Frye general acceptance and toward a Daubert multifactorial test). 
 In contrast, the Indiana Rules of Evidence grant courts significant discretion. See IND. R. EVID. 
702(b) (2020) (“Expert scientific testimony is admissible only if the court is satisfied that the expert 
testimony rests upon reliable scientific principles”). The Indiana Supreme Court was concerned with 
liberalizing the admission of reliable scientific evidence because it wanted judges to have significant 
gatekeeping abilities. Lytle v. Ford Motor Co., 814 N.E.2d 301, 309 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that 
judges have vast gatekeeping abilities under Indiana Rule of Evidence 702). The result is a lack of any 
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1. The Frye Standard for the Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
The Frye test is the more restrictive test for the admission of expert testi-
mony.115 In 1923, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit held in Frye that the standard for admission of expert testimony is 
“general acceptance” of the expert’s methodology in the relevant scientific 
community.116 To satisfy this burden, those proposing scientific testimony from a 
more controversial, theoretical framework must bring forward experts to justify 
their position.117 This standard emphasizes the importance of the validity and 
                                                                                                                           
standard in Indiana; trial judges are encouraged but not required to use the Daubert factors in making 
their admissibility determinations. See Alsheik I, 956 N.E.2d at 1127 (“Though we may consider the 
Daubert factors in determining reliability, there is no specific test or set of prongs which must be 
considered in order to satisfy Indiana Evidence Rule 702(b).”). In Alsheik v. Guerrero (Alsheik I) in 
2011, the Indiana Court of Appeals opined that Indiana does not have a particular standard for expert 
testimony. 956 N.E.2d at 1127. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Indiana applauded the Appeals 
Court’s analysis with respect to the expert testimony and reversed on other grounds. Alsheik v. Guer-
rero (Alsheik II), 979 N.E.2d 151, 153–54 (Ind. 2012) (accepting the lower court’s analysis with re-
spect to expert testimony). Thus the rule articulated in Alsheik I is the governing law of Indiana state 
courts. Alsheik II, 979 N.E.2d at 153. Instead of adhering to a malleable or inflexible rule, judges in 
Indiana are told to use their gatekeeping capacities to avoid arduous processes in the lower courts. 
Alsheik I, 956 N.E.2d at 1125. 
 113 See infra notes 115–119 and accompanying text. 
 114 See infra notes 120– 129 and accompanying text. 
 115 Heather G. Hamilton, Note, The Movement from Frye to Daubert: Where Do the States 
Stand?, 38 JURIMETRICS 201, 209 (1998). 
 116 Frye, 293 F. at 1014. In doing so, the court articulated a standard of admissibility that would 
be used by state and federal courts for nearly seventy years. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579. In fact, even 
though Daubert has now overturned the standard of Frye in federal cases, in state family law courts, 
Frye is still the governing law in the District of Columbia, California, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, 
New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., supra note 111, 
at 3–8. Hawaii also uses the Frye test to determine admissibility, but requires that the expert meet the 
evidentiary standards laid out in Hawaii Rules of Evidence 702 and 703 as well. State v. Montalbo, 
828 P.2d 1274, 1280–81 (Haw. 1992). 
 In 1923, in Frye v. United States, the Supreme Court heard challenges to an expert’s methodolo-
gy. 293 F. at 1013. Defendant Frye was subjected to a lie-detector test that measured his systolic 
blood pressure, allegedly to show that he was lying. Id. Defendant’s counsel objected to the admission 
of the systolic blood pressure test, but the objection was overruled. Id. at 1014. Defendant was con-
victed of murder, and he appealed to the D.C. Circuit. Id. The court overturned the conviction, holding 
that a systolic blood pressure deception test had not gained general acceptance and thus was not ad-
missible. Id. 
 117 See, e.g., M.A. v. A.I., No. A-4021-11T1, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2887, at *4 (Super. 
Ct. App. Div. Dec. 15, 2014) (listing the variety of experts who came forward to testify in the Ionescu 
case); Anjelica Cappellino, Admitting Expert Testimony Under the Frye Standard: The Ultimate 
Guide, EXPERT INST. (June 25, 2020), https://www.expertinstitute.com/resources/insights/admitting-
expert-testimony-under-the-frye-standard-the-ultimate-guide/ [https://perma.cc/GSL4-CG72] (provid-
ing an overview of the ways in which an expert’s theoretical framework can be shown to have attained 
“general acceptance”). General acceptance can be shown “by surveying scientific publications, judi-
cial decisions, or practical applications, or by presenting testimony from scientists as to the attitudes of 
their fellow scientists.” CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203.1 (Robert P. 
Mosteller et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992), Westlaw (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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reliability of the science at issue.118 State courts choosing to adhere to Frye have 
done so largely because of their hesitation in requiring trial court judges to make 
determinations about whether something is scientifically acceptable or not.119 
2. The Daubert Standard for the Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
The Daubert standard is a more flexible test than Frye.120 In 1992, the 
Supreme Court decided in Daubert that the Federal Rules of Evidence super-
seded Frye, and the Court generated a multifactorial test for the admissibility 
of expert testimony.121 Relevant to the Daubert case was Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702, which governs expert testimony and requires that such evidence 
help the trier of fact.122 
The Court ultimately held that Rule 702 superseded the general ac-
ceptance test articulated in Frye.123 To be admissible under Daubert, a court 
should consider whether the theory: (1) is testable; (2) has been subject to peer 
review and publication; (3) has a known or potential rate of error; and (4) has 
achieved general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.124 The ex-
                                                                                                                           
 118 See Hamilton, supra note 115, at 204 (explaining that the ease at which the Frye test can be 
administered emphasizes the validity of a scientific method). 
 119 See State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304, 1314–15 (Wash. 1996) (highlighting the difficulty 
judges face when evaluating testimony that is far beyond their own knowledge and experience); see 
also Daniel E. Fisher, Note, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: The Supreme Court Gives 
Federal Judges the Keys to the Gate of Admissibility of Expert Scientific Testimony, 39 S.D. L. REV. 
141, 155 (1994) (noting that district court judges are often given responsibility and authority beyond 
the knowledge and abilities of the court in many cases); Hamilton, supra note 115, at 204 (listing five 
reasons that the Frye test is particularly helpful to a trial court). Legal scholars consider the Frye test 
to be far more conservative than the Daubert standard. 1 SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1.06, Lexis (6th ed. 
2020). 
 120 1 SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1.09 (“There is much language present in the Daubert opinion that 
points to a relaxed standard.”); Hamilton, supra note 115, at 209. 
 121 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579. In a product liability suit, the plaintiffs wanted to have an expert 
testify, but the expert’s methodology did not satisfy the Frye test. Id. The plaintiffs asserted that the 
defendant’s drug, Bendectin, had caused severe birth defects in children and wanted the court to admit 
testimony of experts who tested carcinogens in vitro and in vivo. Id. at 582. At the time, the Frye test 
had been debated in scope and application. Id. at 585–86 (describing the controversy surrounding the 
Frye decision). 
 122 FED. R. EVID. 702(a). 
 123 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588. The U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that, because there was no men-
tion of general acceptance or Frye in Rule 702 itself, it was clear that the drafters of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence did not want to incorporate the general acceptance test. Id. at 589. The Advisory Commit-
tee Notes accompanying Rule 702 also noted that the Committee did incorporate the holding of Daub-
ert in the 2000 Amendment. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. 
 124 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. In making its new standard, the Daubert Court illustrated that 
expert testimony must meet Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), requiring the testimony be both scien-
tific knowledge and helpful in determining a fact. Id. at 592. These factors, although related to Rule 
702, are actually addressing preliminary issues under Rule 104(a). Id. In deciding that testability is 
important to an inquiry of admissibility, the Court demonstrated that modern science is based on test-
ing and modifying hypotheses. Id. at 593. Peer review and publication are similarly indicative of 
modern science, though the Court recognized that some theories are unlikely to be published because 
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amination under the multifactorial Daubert test is fluid; a theory need not meet 
all of these articulated requirements to be admissible under Rule 702.125 
In applying and analyzing the Daubert factors, federal courts have high-
lighted the importance of a trial judge’s “gatekeeping” function in that judges 
must determine whether the testimony is both reliable and relevant.126 As such, 
the trial judges have great discretion when deciding whether to admit evidence 
under Daubert.127 State courts that have adopted these factors have also high-
lighted their flexibility.128 Nonetheless, these courts still require the basis of 
expert testimony to have some foundation in science.129 
II. HOW STATE COURTS TREAT PARENTAL ALIENATION AND  
PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME 
Because of their varying evidentiary standards, different state courts have 
addressed questions surrounding the admissibility of expert testimony related 
to parental alienation syndrome and parental alienation in a variety of ways.130 
                                                                                                                           
they are too new or too niche. Id. As a result, the Court recognized that publication and peer review 
are relevant but are not dispositive to admissibility. Id. at 593–94. The Court also noted that the error 
rate can indicate the reliability of a particular method, as can a theory’s general acceptance. Id. In 
considering widespread acceptance of a theory, the Court said that acceptance can be helpful but does 
not explicitly permit admissibility. Id. at 594–95. 
 125 See id. at 592–94 (“The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one.”); id. 
(highlighting the importance of the newly relaxed requirements for expert testimony). 
 126 See, e.g., Thorpe v. Davol, Inc., No. 008-463ML, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11836, at *49, *89–
91 (D.R.I. Feb. 4, 2011) (reasoning that the Daubert factors are helpful but not definitive nor exhaus-
tive in determining the admissibility of certain expert testimony). Notably, not all of the Daubert fac-
tors apply to every proposed expert’s testimony. See 2 FEDERAL EVIDENCE TACTICS § 7.02 (2020). 
 127 Thorpe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11836, at *51 (“The trial court must have the same kind of 
latitude in deciding how to test an expert’s reliability . . . as it enjoys when it decides whether that 
expert’s relevant testimony is reliable. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmi-
chael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999))). Determining whether testimony meets Daubert, though, can be 
difficult for judges who do not have an underlying expertise in the proffered testimony or scientific 
training. See 2 FEDERAL EVIDENCE PRACTICE GUIDE § 11.18 (updated March 2021). 
 128 See, e.g., Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 919 (Ky. 2004) (criticizing the trial court for 
applying too mechanistic of a methodology in applying the Daubert factors). For example, in a 2004 
case, Miller v. Eldridge, the Kentucky Supreme Court opined that the problems in the plaintiff’s ex-
pert’s methodology—his qualifications, his use of science, and his application of his methodology to 
the facts of the case—were “fertile ground for a robust cross-examination” but still were not a reason 
to exclude the testimony altogether. Id. at 922. 
 129 See Kemp v. State, 280 So. 3d 81, 88–91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (holding that a so-called 
expert’s methodology of eyeballing the shape of crash damage on a vehicle did not come from a solid 
foundation in science); see also Miller, 146 S.W.3d at 922 (warning of the “pseudoscientific quack-
ery” that Daubert is intended to keep out of a trial). 
 130 See infra notes 133–158 and accompanying text. Many appellate courts have also declined to 
address the admissibility of parental alienation syndrome and parental alienation because the issues 
were not properly preserved for appeal. E.g., Grove v. Grove, 386 S.W.3d 603, 606 (denying one 
party a Daubert hearing because the appellant failed to preserve the evidentiary issue for appeal). 
Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court in 2004 declined to address the admissibility issue by holding 
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Section A of this Part discusses how and why courts have allowed testimony 
regarding parental alienation.131 Section B then highlights the reasons that 
courts have excluded such evidence.132 
A. Embracing the Rejection: When States Accept Evidence of Parental 
Alienation Syndrome and Parental Alienation in Family Court 
Some states allow testimony about both parental alienation syndrome and 
parental alienation into the courtroom with little hesitation.133 For instance, 
New York, which employs the Frye v. United States test for admissibility of 
expert evidence, has a relatively long history of recognizing parental alienation 
in its family courtrooms.134 The concept was first introduced to New York 
State courts in 1991 when a parent was accused and found guilty of program-
ming a child to make a false accusation of sexual abuse.135 As parental aliena-
tion syndrome and parental alienation continued to arise in New York cases, 
the state courts began to require evidence that a party intentionally engaged in 
alienating behaviors solely for the purpose of programming the child.136 
                                                                                                                           
that the testimony about parental alienation syndrome was not the basis for the lower court’s ruling in 
In re Marriage of de Bates, 819 N.E.2d 714, 731 (Ill. 2004). 
 131 See infra notes 133–142 and accompanying text. 
 132 See infra notes 143–158 and accompanying text. 
 133 See infra notes 133–142 and accompanying text (outlining the practices of several New York 
and Connecticut courts, which often admit testimony of both concepts). 
 134 See J.F. v. D.F., No. 2012/01795, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5991, at *9–22 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 6, 
2018) (providing a historical overview of parental alienation in New York). 
 135 In re Karen B. v. Clyde M., 574 N.Y.S.2d 267, 271–72 (Fam. Ct. 1991), aff’d sub nom. Karen 
PP v. Clyde QQ, 602 N.Y.S.2d 709, 709 (App. Div. 1993). In 1991, the Fulton County Family Court 
held that evidence of parental alienation syndrome was admissible when a mother accused a child’s 
father of sexually assaulting the child in In re Karen B. v. Clyde M. 574 N.Y.S.2d at 268. According 
to the mother, the child disclosed sexual abuse in 1990. Id. The mother told a family friend who then 
spoke to the child and called Family Services in New York. Id. The child was interviewed by a series 
of social workers who ultimately determined that the child, Mandi, was not sexually abused by her 
father. Id. at 270. In rendering its decision, the Family Court referred to the works of Gardner to ex-
plain why a child may lie about sexual abuse. Id. at 271–72. Though the court did not explicitly state 
that Mandi was suffering from parental alienation syndrome, it did describe the programming and 
brainwashing that the child experienced, blaming her mother. Id. at 272. Consequently, the court mod-
ified the visitation agreement and removed custody of the child from her mother, and granted custody 
to Mandi’s father. Id. 
 136 E.g., In re Smith v. Bombard, 714 N.Y.S.2d 336, 338 (App. Div. 2002) (stating on appeal that 
the father’s argument that the mother made statements about him for the “sole purpose” of “intention-
ally” alienating the child was inconsistent with the trial record). In 2002, a New York appeals court 
held, in In re Smith v. Bombard, that a father had not successfully demonstrated evidence of parental 
alienation syndrome to justify his refusal to pay child support. Id. 
 Another New York court even suggested that parental alienation syndrome deserved a Frye hear-
ing. See Zafran v. Zafran (Zafran I), 740 N.Y.S.2d 596, 599–600 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (granting a motion 
for a Frye hearing on parental alienation syndrome), aff’d, 761 N.Y.S.2d 317 (App. Div. 2003). In 
2002, in Zafran I, a New York trial court examined, as a matter of first impression, whether parental 
alienation syndrome should be admissible as expert testimony. Id. at 600. At the time, the parties’ two 
sons were exclusively residing with the father and had no contact with their mother, and the parties’ 
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One New York trial court, seeking to clarify what is necessary for admis-
sion of parental alienation testimony, drew a comparison with the tort of inten-
tional inflection of emotional distress.137 When analyzed from this lens, paren-
tal alienation then requires that the alleged alienating conduct: (1) be directed 
by the favored parent, without any other legitimate justification; (2) be per-
formed with the intention of damaging the reputation of the other parent in the 
child’s eyes or disregarding a substantial possibility of causing such damage; (3) 
proximately cause a diminished interest of the child in spending time with the 
non-favored parent and; (4) result in the child’s refusing to spend time with the 
targeted parent, either in person or via other forms of communication.138 
Courts in other states have admitted expert testimony about parental al-
ienation using the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. factors.139 
For example, in 2017 in J.H. v. J.D., a Delaware Family Court allowed testi-
mony about parental alienation in a custody battle between a biological mother 
and an adoptive father.140 In its decision, the court looked at the credentials of 
the testifying expert, a clinical psychologist, and said that he “offered relevant 
evidence based upon reliable methods.”141 
                                                                                                                           
daughter resided exclusively with her mother and had no contact with her father. Zafran v. Zafran 
(Zafran II), 761 N.Y.S.2d 317, 318–19 (App. Div. 2003) (explaining the original custody arrangement 
when the trial court decided the Frye issue). The court ultimately ordered permanent custody of the 
daughter to the mother, pointing to the alienating behavior of the father as the reason for the custody 
modification. Id. at 319. 
 137 J.F., 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5991, at *19–21. Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a 
civil tort imposing liability on those who engage in offensive conduct resulting in serious emotional 
distress. Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 702 (N.Y. 1993). The tort in New York has four 
elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent to cause, or disregard of a substantial proba-
bility of causing, severe emotional distress; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and injury; 
and (4) severe emotional distress. Id. 
 138 J.F., 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5991, at *22. In creating a new “test” for parental alienation, the 
J.F. v. D.F. court rejected parental alienation as applied to the facts of the case. Id. at *12. The court’s 
formal recognition of the concept, however, is significant. Id. at *89; see also In re E.S. v. S.S., 2019 
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1183, at *17–18 (Fam. Ct. Mar. 18, 2019) (demonstrating that New York courts 
have attempted to embrace parental alienation as a concept without accepting it as a syndrome). 
 139 E.g., J.H. v. J.D., No. CN16-33191, 2017 WL 4403331, at *7 (Del. Fam. Ct. Aug. 17, 2017) 
(examining an expert’s testimony about parental alienation using the Daubert factors). At no point, 
though, did the court explain how it actually evaluated the proposed theoretical framework, as should 
be required under Daubert. See generally id. (stating that testimony was admissible under Daubert 
without applying the Daubert factors to the expert testimony at issue). But see Bowen v. E.I. DuPont 
de Nemours & Co., 906 A.2d 787, 795 (Del. 2006) (explaining the multifactorial test that Delaware 
courts must undergo when examining methodology). Instead, the court relied on the expert’s testimo-
ny about “bad parenting practices” without examining the underlying theoretical framework of paren-
tal alienation. See J.H., 2017 WL 4403331, at *8. 
 140 2017 WL 4403331, at *7. 
 141 Id. 
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Some commentators laud the decision to allow evidence of parental alien-
ation syndrome and parental alienation into the courtroom because, they argue, 
it goes hand in hand with the best interest of the child standard.142 
B. Rejecting Rejection: When States Do Not Accept Evidence of Parental 
Alienation and Parental Alienation Syndrome in Family Court 
Other states, though, when given the opportunity to hear testimony about 
parental alienation syndrome and parental alienation, have rejected it.143 For 
instance, several state courts have rejected both theories by using the Frye test 
for admissibility.144 A New York criminal court, for example, found that paren-
tal alienation syndrome had not achieved general acceptance as required by the 
state’s evidentiary rules.145 This stands in contrast with the holding of other 
New York family courts with respect to whether parental alienation syndrome 
has achieved general acceptance in the scientific community.146 
Furthermore, not all family courts in New York have been willing to rec-
ognize parental alienation as a valid concept worthy of testimony in family 
courts.147 For example, in 2017, in In re Montoya v. Davis, the Appellate Divi-
sion of the New York Supreme Court expressed skepticism of parental aliena-
tion when it rejected a forensic evaluator’s testimony about the mother’s alleg-
                                                                                                                           
 142 E.g., Richard A. Warshak, When Evaluators Get It Wrong: False Positive IDs and Parental 
Alienation, 26 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 54, 64 (2020) (providing suggestions for evaluators to im-
prove research on parental alienation so that such evidence can be used more frequently in the court-
room). See generally Schwartz, supra note 5 (arguing that parental alienation fits within or should be 
incorporated into the best interest of the child standard). One student Note, cited by several state 
courts, even suggested that family law is the best legal space to address parental alienation. Id. at 826–
29; see, e.g., Baker v. Jefferson, No. B279226, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7679, at *13–14 (Nov. 
7, 2017) (citing Schwartz, supra note 5, as evidence that family court is the proper venue for parental 
alienation); Martínez v. Vega, No. KLAN201800835, 2019 PR App. LEXIS 1479, at *44 (Ct. App. 
May 31, 2019) (referencing Schwartz, supra note 5, to draw a parallel to jurisdictions where parental 
alienation is sometimes used as a tort). The student author suggests that the best interest standard 
should explicitly bar a parent from engaging in parental alienation. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 833–36. 
The author believes that doing so will be a preventative way to address the problem of parental aliena-
tion. Id. at 833–34. 
 143 See infra notes 143–158 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Traux v. Traux, 874 P.2d 10, 
11 (Nev. 1994) (upholding a trial court’s decision to reject testimony about parental alienation syn-
drome). For example, in 1994 in Traux v. Traux, the Nevada Supreme Court highlighted the discretion 
of the family court mediator to determine what testimony was credible. Id. It did so after the report of 
a court-appointed special advocate and a third expert testified that there was actual parental abuse by 
the non-custodial parent and opined that there was no evidence of parental alienation syndrome. Id. 
Because two experts disagreed with the opinion of one expert arguing for parental alienation syn-
drome, the court felt comfortable rejecting that testimony. Id. 
 144 E.g., People v. Fortin, 706 N.Y.S.2d 611, 613–14 (Nassau Cnty. Ct. 2000). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Compare id. (barring parental alienation syndrome testimony), with Zafran v. Zafran, 740 
N.Y.S.2d 596, 600 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (allowing consideration of parental alienation syndrome testimo-
ny), aff’d, 761 N.Y.S.2d 317 (App. Div. 2003). 
 147 E.g., In re Montoya v. Davis, 66 N.Y.S.3d 350, 353 (App. Div. 2017). 
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edly problematic alienating behavior.148 In so doing, the court indicated that 
parental alienation had not received “general[] accept[ance]” in the scientific 
community, as required under Frye, and that this was demonstrated in part by 
the fact that it had not been accepted by the APA’s DSM-5.149 
Some Daubert states have also rejected expert testimony about parental 
alienation syndrome and parental alienation.150 For example, in 2012, the Con-
necticut Supreme Court in Mastrangelo v. Mastrangelo conducted a hearing to 
examine testimony about parental alienation syndrome and parental aliena-
tion.151 Two experts testified, and although both agreed that parental alienation 
may be a behavior of one parent, one expert staunchly advocated for parental 
alienation syndrome, and one expert strongly denied the existence of the syn-
drome.152 Because the experts were not in disagreement about parental aliena-
tion’s existence as a phenomenon, the Mastrangelo court did not examine the 
issue, but it did conduct a hearing on the admissibility of parental alienation 
syndrome evidence.153 Furthermore, because the theory had been “soundly 
rejected” by many in the scientific and legal fields, the Connecticut court held 
that parental alienation syndrome did not pass the state’s version of the Daub-
ert test.154 
Legal scholars, too, have been critical of the admissibility of testimony 
about parental alienation.155 These critics accuse the theory of being a pseudo-
science used by professionals and abusive parents to undermine abuse allega-
                                                                                                                           
 148 Id. In discrediting the report of the forensic evaluator, the Montoya v. Davis court, in 2017, 
found that the evaluator had a strong bias toward the father. Id. at 353–54. For example, the evaluator 
repeatedly denigrated the mother without cause but praised the father on multiple occasions. Id. at 
353. The evaluator recommended a change in custody from the mother to the father because of paren-
tal alienation. Id. at 354. This decision was ultimately overturned on appeal. Id. at 358–59 (modifying 
the parenting schedule to return custody of the child to the mother with visitation rights to the father). 
 149 Id. at 353 n.5 (“[T]he Court is concerned about the forensic evaluator having been deemed an 
expert in ‘parental alienation,’ which is not a diagnosis included in the Fifth Edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.”). The court also pointed out that parental alienation has 
been explicitly rejected in the New York criminal justice system. Id.; see also Fortin, 874 P.2d at 
613–14 (applying the Frye test to parental alienation syndrome and determining that it did not meet 
the standard for admissibility). 
 150 E.g., Mastrangelo v. Mastrangelo, No. NNHFA054012782S, 2012 WL 6901161, at *9 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2012). 
 151 Id. at *2. 
 152 Id. at *5–6. 
 153 Id. at *8. 
 154 Id. at *8–9. 
 155 See generally Meier, supra note 16; see also Emmaline Campbell, Note, How Domestic Vio-
lence Batterers Use Court Proceedings in Family Courts to Abuse Victims, and How Courts Can Put 
a Stop to It, 24 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 41, 46–47 (2017) (suggesting that parental alienation is still 
used in family courts despite the fact that it has generally been discredited by the scientific communi-
ty). 
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tions.156 A recent study found that courts were less likely to credit abuse allega-
tions made by women against men when the man raised parental alienation as 
a defense.157 Critics are particularly concerned about the use of parental aliena-
tion against survivors of domestic violence and encourage courts to reject pa-
rental alienation as a valid concept for testimony.158 
III. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS  
FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF PARENTAL ALIENATION 
With an understanding of how state courts have handled parental aliena-
tion in the past, this Part employs a critical analysis of the admissibility of pa-
rental alienation as a concept.159 Because parental alienation is a more liberal 
and recent construction of parental alienation syndrome, this Part assumes that 
if parental alienation cannot survive evidentiary scrutiny, nor can the syn-
drome.160 Section A of this Part examines why parental alienation, if allowed, 
should always require expert testimony.161 Section B then addresses the admis-
sibility of such expert testimony under the Frye v. United States and Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. standards.162 Section C highlights the pub-
lic policy reasons that the term “parental alienation” and the related concepts 
should be excluded from family court discourse altogether.163 
A. Courts Should Require Expert Testimony in Cases 
Involving Parental Alienation 
The majority of family law courts, similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 
702(a), require that expert testimony be helpful to the factfinder.164 With paren-
                                                                                                                           
 156 JOAN S. MEIER ET AL., GEO. WASH. UNIV. L. SCH. PUB. L. RSCH. & GEO. WASH. UNIV. LE-
GAL STUDS. RSCH., PAPER NO. 2019-56, CHILD CUSTODY OUTCOMES IN CASES INVOLVING PAREN-
TAL ALIENATION AND ABUSE ALLEGATIONS 3 (2019), https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=2712&context=faculty_publications [https://perma.cc/CAU5-HFEM]. 
 157 Id. at 13–14. This study found that courts were more likely to discredit child abuse and partner 
abuse when men raised parental alienation cross-claims against women. Id. Courts were likely to 
credit allegations of domestic abuse without parental alienation in only 45% of cases; with parental 
alienation, this percentage was even lower. Id. at 12–14. 
 158 Campbell, supra note 155, at 46–47 (arguing that parental alienation is a means for batterers to 
manipulate the courts and hold against domestic violence survivors). This student Note completely 
rejects the concept of parental alienation as “discredited.” Id. at 47. 
 159 See infra notes 160–223 and accompanying text. 
 160 See infra notes 160–223 and accompanying text. 
 161 See infra notes 164–171 and accompanying text. 
 162 See infra notes 172–183 and accompanying text. 
 163 See infra notes 210–223 and accompanying text. 
 164 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702(a) (articulating that an expert may testify to her opinion if the 
testimony is helpful to the trier of fact); 7.01 Opinion of Expert Witness, N.Y. UNIFIED CT. SYS. 
GUIDE TO N.Y. EVIDENCE, https://www.nycourts.gov/JUDGES/evidence/7-OPINION/ARTICLE-7-
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tal alienation, proponents suggest that the child’s rejection behavior is irration-
al, and often inconsistent with the child’s actual experience and relationship 
with the accused parent.165 Consequently, the insight that an “expert” could 
provide on a child’s behavior would absolutely be helpful to a fact-finding 
judge.166 If the testimony is simply about the alienating parent’s behavior, then 
an expert is not necessary, but the term “parental alienation” should not be 
used because it comes with several loaded and varying definitions.167 
Parental alienation advocates generally agree with the proposition that the 
testimony does, in fact, require an expert.168 Frequently, therefore, judges act-
ing without the guidance of psychologists and other experts must make a deci-
sion for which they are unqualified.169 Consideration of expert testimony 
would alleviate some of the responsibility of judges by putting the responsibil-
ity of interpreting and explaining the “scientific” evidence on the proposed 
expert.170 Just because certain testimony should be considered in the context of 
an expert, it does not make it admissible in a family court.171 
                                                                                                                           
RULES.pdf [https://perma.cc/44S9-EPLV] (requiring evidence to help the factfinder in subsection 
(1)(b)). 
 165 GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 217 (stating that attorneys and judges need the testimony of ex-
perts when it comes to parental alienation). Gottlieb characterizes parental alienation syndrome as 
“baffling” to the legal system. Id. One court employee even told Gottlieb that mental health expert 
testimony is crucial to family law cases. Id. Other court employees agreed that expert testimony can 
inform judges of the seemingly irrational behavior of children. Id. at 217–47 (providing a series of 
anecdotes from court employees, mental health practitioners, and lawyers about cases where testimo-
ny about parental alienation was important to the outcome of the legal case). 
 166 Id. at 217. 
 167 BERNET, supra note 7, at 3–7 (explaining the definitional inconsistencies that advocates of 
parental alienation syndrome and parental alienation have used since the concepts’ inceptions); id. at 5 
(“We are explaining these definitions in detail because we realize that some authors have given other 
meanings to ‘parental alienation’ . . . .”). Some scholars, Bernet notes, have used parental alienation to 
describe the parent and have used parental alienation syndrome to describe the child. Id. at 5. Others 
have used parental alienation to describe any relational problem, justified or not, between the parent 
and child, and used parental alienation syndrome to describe the unjustified rejection of the parent. Id. 
Because of the definitional inconsistency, Bernet proposed his own definition for “parental alienation 
disorder” to clarify any confusion. Id. When there is definitional inconsistency among mental health 
professionals, certainly there will be confusion among judges who lack the nuanced understanding of 
mental disorders. See GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 218 (“If the mental health professional is unaware 
of what the [parental alienation syndrome] is, then how is . . . the judge going to be made aware of its 
presence . . . ?”) (quoting an interview with a family law attorney)). But see In re Suzanne QQ. v. Ben 
RR., 75 N.Y.S.3d 697, 699 (App. Div. 2018) (holding that a trial court need not admit an expert’s 
testimony to consider the concept of parental alienation). 
 168 See GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 218. 
 169 See Floray v. State, 720 A.2d 1132, 1135 (Del. 1998) (highlighting that expert testimony is 
useful, especially when a child behaves in a way that is inconsistent with a factfinder’s expectations). 
 170 GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 218–19. 
 171 See infra notes 174–223 and accompanying text (discussing the inadmissibility of parental 
alienation under different state rules for the admission of expert testimony). For example, handwriting 
analysis is often influential in criminal cases. See, e.g., Pettus v. United States, 37 A.3d 213, 215 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (describing how handwriting testimony assisted the jury in convicting a defendant of 
1788 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1759 
B. Expert Testimony About Parental Alienation Is Not Admissible  
Under the Most Common Expert Testimony Standards 
In fact, as currently proposed, parental alienation is not admissible under 
Daubert or Frye, and parental alienation syndrome, as a more controversial 
version of parental alienation, is certainly not either.172 Subsection 1 analyzes 
                                                                                                                           
felony-murder, sexual assault, and theft). Handwriting experts, though, are controversial. Mark Page 
et al., Forensic Identification Science Evidence Since Daubert: Part II—Judicial Reasoning in Deci-
sions to Exclude Forensic Identification Evidence on Grounds of Reliability, 56 J. FORENSIC SCIS. 
913, 914 (2011) (“From examination of the 81 cases where forensic identification science [including 
handwriting testimony] was excluded, 50 of these cited a reason characterized as one of ‘reliabil-
ity.’”). Courts that do not accept handwriting experts disregard how helpful the testimony would be 
and focus on the theoretical framework itself. See, e.g., Almeciga v. Ctr. for Investigative Reporting, 
Inc., 185 F. Supp. 3d 401, 407–08, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (explaining that “handwriting analysis in 
general is unlikely to meet the admissibility requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702” and 
providing four reasons that such analysis fails the Daubert inquiry). 
 172 See infra notes 174–183 and accompanying text. Because parental alienation is a more liberal 
and recent construction of parental alienation syndrome, this Part assumes that if parental alienation 
cannot survive evidentiary scrutiny, neither can the syndrome. See supra notes 160–171 and accom-
panying text; infra notes 173–223 and accompanying text. 
 Parental alienation is also not admissible when using state-generated rules for the admission of 
expert testimony. See Alsheik v. Guerrero, 956 N.E.2d 1115, 1127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d on 
other grounds, 979 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. 2012); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 772 (Minn. 1980). Min-
nesota, for example, uses a particularly stringent standard for expert testimony. Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 
772. In State v. Mack, decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in 1980, the court added an addi-
tional threshold to the already more stringent Frye standard. Id. This creates a rule that is even more 
critical of an expert’s methodology. Id.; see Alter, supra note 112, at 659 (explaining that, under the 
Minnesota test, a theory must be generally accepted and have accuracy with respect to the fact pattern 
to which it is being applied). Under the Frye-Mack test, individuals proposing an expert must meet 
two prongs: (1) evidence must be generally accepted in its relevant scientific community and (2) the 
theory must have foundational reliability. See State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 97–98 (Minn. 1990) 
(explaining the Frye-Mack test in greater detail); see also Alter, supra note 112, at 659. As discussed 
in the general acceptance analysis under Frye, parental alienation does not meet the first prong of the 
Frye-Mack test. See infra notes 174–183 and accompanying text. Even ignoring the general ac-
ceptance prong, testimony on parental alienation does not have foundational reliability, as required by 
this test. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 17 N.W.2d 150, 168–71 (Minn. 2012). Min-
nesota courts have held that a theory has foundational reliability when it is found in a diagnostic tool. 
See Rush v. Jostock, 710 N.W.2d 570, 575 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a test was reliable 
because it was present in the DSM-IV). For example, in 2006 in Rush v. Jostock, a Minnesota court of 
appeals held that an orthopedist could testify to a diagnosis present in the DSM-IV-TR because of his 
medical experience and the reliability of the diagnostic tool. Id. at 573–77. More recently, Minnesota 
has defined foundational reliability as based upon reliable scientific principles and independent valida-
tion. Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 168–71 (holding that a theory of repressed memories did not meet the Frye-
Mack standard). The theory that memories of trauma are repressed to the point of inaccessibility is con-
troversial, similar to parental alienation. See David J. Ley, Forget Me Not: The Persistent Myth of Re-
pressed Memories, PSYCH. TODAY (Oct. 6, 2019), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/women-
who-stray/201910/forget-me-not-the-persistent-myth-repressed-memories [https://perma.cc/L5F2-
ZHQ8] (discussing the controversy surrounding repressed memories). In the 1990s, therapists began 
encouraging people to tap into their “[r]epressed [m]emories,” resulting in numerous accusations of 
sexual abuse and Satanic cults. Id. The FBI, though, could find no evidence of organized cults of Sa-
tanic child abusers, and memory researchers found that the techniques used to uncover “[r]epressed 
[m]emories” also worked very well to implant false memories of things that never happened. Id. Pa-
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parental alienation under the Frye standard, and subsection 2 looks at the con-
cept under the multifactor test articulated in Daubert.173 
1. A Lack of General Acceptance: A Lack of Admissibility 
Parental alienation is not admissible under the Frye standard because it 
fails the “general admissibility” test.174 When examining whether expert evi-
dence is admissible under the Frye standard, the question is relatively simple: 
has the proposed theory achieved “general acceptance” in the relevant profes-
sional community?175 This test questions the underlying scientific principles 
that support an expert’s conclusion; it does not address the conclusion itself.176 
The purpose of using the Frye standard to evaluate evidence is to ensure that 
courts exclude a method that purports to be certain when that evidence is new, 
novel, or invalid.177 
Parental alienation has not achieved general acceptance in the mental health 
community and, therefore, should not be the basis for admissible expert testimo-
ny under Frye.178 It draws criticism from the scientific and legal communities 
alike.179 Notably, the DSM-5 rejected parental alienation despite proposals from 
the theory’s supporters.180 Although the DSM-5 is not the exclusive indicator of 
general acceptance in the mental health field, its rejection of parental alienation 
is significant, particularly because the newest version of the diagnostic tool made 
other significant changes to diagnoses to reflect gender biases.181 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                           
rental alienation is not found in any diagnostic tools, nor is it based on scientific hypotheses or been 
subjected consistently to peer review. See Warshak, supra note 142, at 55 (calling for more extensive 
research into parental alienation). 
 173 See infra notes 184–209 and accompanying text. 
 174 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); infra notes 175–183 and ac-
companying text. 
 175 Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
 176 Id. 
 177 People v. New, 2014 IL 116306, ¶ 26 (explaining that Frye is intended to protect the jury from 
unhelpful and invalid scientific testimony). The DSM itself also cautions that psychiatry is not an 
exact science. DSM-5, supra note 13, at 25. 
 178 See Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (opining that scientific evidence is not admissible in a court unless it 
has achieved general acceptance in the relevant field). 
 179 See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 806–14 (providing the history and controversy of parental al-
ienation syndrome and parental alienation); Wood, supra note 20, at 1369–77 (summarizing the con-
troversy surrounding parental alienation syndrome). Compare MEIER ET AL., supra note 156, at 3 
(critiquing parental alienation from a legal and feminist perspective), and Walker & Shapiro, supra 
note 74, at 267–68 (critiquing parental alienation disorder from a mental health perspective), with 
BERNET, supra note 7, at 9–10 (articulating twenty reasons that parental alienation should be included 
in the DSM-5 from a mental health perspective), and Schwartz, supra note 5, at 840 (advocating for 
parental alienation from a legal perspective). 
 180 See APA Board of Trustees Approves DSM-5, supra note 6. 
 181 Id. The DSM-5 made significant changes to its structure and diagnoses. See, e.g., DSM-5, 
supra note 13, at 451–59 (removing “gender dysphoria,” where one’s experienced gender does not 
match the gender attributed to that person by others, as a mental health diagnosis); id. at 50–59 (com-
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no professional organization whatsoever has recognized the existence of parental 
alienation.182 Consequently, parental alienation is not admissible under Frye be-
cause it has not achieved general acceptance in the scientific community.183 
2. Under Daubert 
Under the Daubert standard, too, parental alienation testimony is inad-
missible.184 When applying the Daubert standard, judges must consider a vari-
ety of factors to determine the admissibility of an expert’s methodology.185 The 
first Daubert factor concerns testability.186 Proponents of the theory have not 
designed studies to measure the validity and salience of parental alienation.187 
Instead, theorists rely on surveys and personal experiences, thus making paren-
tal alienation virtually untestable.188 
                                                                                                                           
pounding three former diagnoses—Autistic Disorder, Asperger’s Disorder, and Pervasive Develop-
mental Disorder not Otherwise Specified—into one diagnosis, Autism Spectrum Disorder); see also 
DSM-5, AUTISM SOC’Y, https://www.autism-society.org/what-is/diagnosis/diagnostic-classifications/ 
[https://perma.cc/R5QL-9RUF] (explaining that the DSM-5 redefined the diagnosis of autism). 
 182 Mastrangelo v. Mastrangelo, No. NNHFA054012782S, 2012 WL 6901161, at *7 (Conn. Su-
per. Ct. Dec. 20, 2012) (recounting Gardner’s concession that parental alienation syndrome had not 
been generally accepted by the scientific community). 
 183 See, e.g., People v. Fortin, 706 N.Y.S.2d 611, 614 (Nassau Cnty. Ct. 2000) (holding that pa-
rental alienation syndrome does not meet the standard laid out in Frye, and thus testimony regarding 
the syndrome should not have been allowed in a criminal trial). Although People v. Fortin, decided in 
2000 by a New York county court, is a criminal case addressing parental alienation syndrome and not 
parental alienation, its holding should be extended in Frye states to cover parental alienation as well. 
See id. Parental alienation stems from the arguments of Gardner, whose proposal of the theory was 
deeply tied to his own belief that the increase in child accusations of sexual abuse in the context of a 
divorce had a “high likelihood of being false.” GARDNER, supra note 14, at 4. As a result, it has been 
influenced by the agenda of Gardner, and it is difficult to extricate parental alienation from parental 
alienation syndrome. Meier, supra note 16, at 679–80 (accusing parental alienation of being a “thinly 
veiled instrument” for the perpetuation of parental abuse and a direct bias against mothers); see Rich-
ard Ducote, Guardians Ad Litem in Private Custody Litigation: The Case for Abolition, 3 LOY. J. 
PUB. INT. L. 106, 141 (2002) (accusing parental alienation of being a non-existent disorder used as a 
tool against domestic violence survivors); Wood, supra note 20, at 1373–75, 1382 (citing studies that 
discredit Gardner’s claims about sex abuse “hysteria”). 
 184 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993); infra notes 185–209 
and accompanying text. 
 185 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94 (suggesting that judges consider the following, non-
exhaustive factors in assessing an expert’s reliability: (1) testability; (2) subjection to peer review and 
publication; (3) a known or potential rate of error; and, potentially, (4) general acceptance). 
 186 Id. at 593. 
 187 See BERNET, supra note 7, at 119 (acknowledging that research on parental alienation theories 
has been “delayed and compromised” because of definitional inconsistencies); see also infra note 190 
and accompanying text (providing an overview of the lack of parental alienation studies published in 
peer-reviewed journals). 
 188 See Richard A. Warshak, Ten Parental Alienation Fallacies That Compromise Decisions in 
Court and in Therapy, 46 PROF’L PSYCH.: RSCH. & PRAC. 235, 235–46 (2015) (outlining common 
misconceptions about parental alienation based on surveys and the author’s professional experience); 
see also Baker & Damall, supra note 39, at 61–62 (highlighting the methodological concern about the 
researchers’ inability to differentiate between parental alienation syndrome and estrangement for legit-
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Parental alienation also does not meet the second Daubert factor, which 
requires peer review, because no nationwide and representative study of the 
proposed diagnosis has been published in a peer-reviewed journal.189 This 
means that no study has been conducted to assess the frequency of this alleged 
behavior by parents directed at children.190 Peer-reviewed journals also gener-
ally do not publish research on parental alienation.191 Furthermore, mental 
health professionals cannot assert a known rate of error in parental aliena-
tion—a third Daubert factor—because no representative studies exist.192 Final-
ly, the scientific community has not necessarily accepted parental alienation 
theories, the final factor courts should consider.193 Based on the explicit Daub-
ert factors, then, courts employing that test should not accept parental aliena-
tion testimony.194 
The Daubert Court also advised that the explicit factors provided by the 
Court were not the only ones that should be considered in evaluating a scien-
tific theory.195 More specifically, the Daubert Court cautioned against shutting 
                                                                                                                           
imate reasons). See generally BERNET, supra note 7 (explaining the reasons that parental alienation 
should be admitted to the DSM-5 and ICD-11 based on the personal experiences of practitioners). 
 189 See Warshak, supra note 142, at 55 (conceding that critics have called parental alienation 
research “weak”). 
 190 Id. Instead, proponents of parental alienation publish and cite their own research and studies. 
See generally GARDNER, supra note 14 (offering no scientific research to support his argument); War-
shak, supra note 188, at 246–49 (referencing thirteen of the own author’s works to support the exist-
ence of parental alienation). Gardner published most of his books through Creative Therapeutics, Inc., 
his own publishing company. Creative Therapeutics, OPEN LIBR., https://openlibrary.org/publishers/
Creative_Therapeutics [https://perma.cc/7CZM-H4UA] (listing the thirty books that Creative Thera-
peutics has published, all of them authored by Gardner); see RICHARD A. GARDNER, MISPERCEP-
TIONS VERSUS FACTS ABOUT RICHARD A. GARDNER, M.D., (June 9, 1999), http://www.fact.on.ca/
Info/pas/misperce.htm [https://perma.cc/U8JL-GA8N] (acknowledging a “misperception” that Gard-
ner publishes his books through his own company). 
 191 See Houchin et al., supra note 76, at 129 (pointing to a lack of peer-reviewed empirical studies 
on parental alienation). See generally Warshak, supra note 188, at 246–49. By not subjecting their 
research to the peer review process, parental alienation theorists miss out on meaningful critique. 
Wood, supra note 20, at 1412 n.345. 
 192 See Houchin et al., supra note 76, at 129. 
 193 See supra notes 174–183 and accompanying text (explaining the reasons that parental aliena-
tion has not been accepted by the general scientific community and thus does not survive Frye scruti-
ny). 
 194 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993) (detailing the explicit 
factors to be considered in evaluating expert testimony under Daubert). 
 195 Id. at 594 (stating that the Daubert test is a flexible one). State courts, too, have cautioned 
against an overly mechanical application of these factors. Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 918 
(Ky. 2004) (criticizing the lower court for applying too “mechanistic” of a Daubert analysis because 
“[r]igid application of the Daubert factors . . . simply lumps methodologies like the ones used by 
[blood flow expert] in with the likes of magic and snake-oil cures simply because the methodologies 
are novel”). The Kentucky Supreme Court in Miller v. Eldridge was highly critical of the lower 
court’s rejection of the blood flow expert’s testimony, reasoning that the application of Daubert by the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals did not allow for the flexibility intended by the standard. Id. at 918–19. 
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out innovation in scientific methodology from the courtroom.196 Therefore, it 
also bears consideration whether parental alienation is novel at all.197 In evalu-
ating whether parental alienation is a novel innovation, it is instructive to ex-
amine another relatively recently proposed syndrome: battered person syn-
drome (formerly battered woman syndrome).198 
Battered woman syndrome first emerged as a legal defense to explain why 
domestic violence victims murdered their intimate partners.199 Mental health 
professionals and legal advocates observed numerous victims of domestic vio-
lence who had lashed out against their spouses when there seemingly was no 
imminent threat as a result of the trauma.200 It has been considered a subcategory 
of the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) diagnosis in the DSM since the in-
ception of the DSM Fourth Edition Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR), the precursor to 
the DSM-5.201 Furthermore, battered woman syndrome has been the subject of 
numerous peer-reviewed and representative studies in addition to case studies.202 
                                                                                                                           
 196 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. 
 197 E.g., id. (calling for an approach that respects the novelty of some scientific theories and 
methodologies). Merriam Webster’s Dictionary defines “innovation” as “a new idea, method, or de-
vice,” and “novelty” as something “new or unusual.” Innovation, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/innovation [https://perma.cc/2MFK-WHAV]; Novelty, 
MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/novelty [https://
perma.cc/J9LE-3T4E]. 
 198 See generally Walker, Empirical Findings, supra note 86 (providing a conceptual overview of 
battered woman syndrome). Battered woman syndrome is a category of PTSD under the DSM-IV-TR 
that explains that women who have experienced domestic violence engage in behaviors of “learned 
helplessness.” Id. at 145 (referencing Martin Selgiman’s studies of learned helplessness whereby 
animals, when repeatedly exposed to averse stimuli, eventually accepted the punishment and did not 
take steps to save themselves, even when they could). Walker’s theory of battered woman syndrome 
built on this theory: survivors of domestic violence who were repeatedly exposed to abuse would not 
take steps to help themselves because they learned that acceptance ultimately resulted in a cessation of 
the violence. Id. at 145–46. In 2002, Walker’s battered woman syndrome symptomology included: (1) 
PTSD criteria of “[r]e-experiencing the event,” “[n]umbing of responsiveness,” and “[h]yperarousal”; 
and (2) additional effects of “[d]isrupted interpersonal relationships,” “[d]ifficulties with body im-
age/somatic concerns,” and “[s]exual and intimacy problems.” Id. at 147. 
 199 Noel Rivers-Schutte, Note, History of the Battered Woman Syndrome—A Fallen Attempt to Re-
define the Reasonable Person Standard in Domestic Violence Cases, SETON HALL U. EREPOSITORY, 
2013, at 1–5, https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1618&context=student_scholar
ship [https://perma.cc/4S3U-5K9R] (providing a history of battered woman syndrome). 
 200 Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome, supra note 86. 
 201 Id. (stating the criteria of battered woman syndrome that have been included in the DSM-IV-
TR). In one of her seminal works, Walker articulated how the symptoms of battered woman syndrome 
could be “subsumed” by a diagnosis of PTSD. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYN-
DROME 123–25 (1984). The DSM-IV-TR included the behaviors critical to Walker’s definition of 
battered woman syndrome, including symptoms like reexperiencing “recurrent and intrusive . . . recol-
lections [and] . . . dreams,” “[p]ersistent avoidance of stimuli,” including “feeling of detachment or 
estrangement from others,” and “restricted range of affect.” DSM-5, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 468 (4th ed. text rev. 2000). 
 202 Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome, supra note 86. 
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Although it has its share of critics, battered woman syndrome achieved general 
acceptance relatively quickly over the course of twenty years.203 
In comparison, parental alienation has been a concept since 1984 and still 
has not achieved general acceptance in the legal or psychological communi-
ty.204 Although the theory may have been new in the 1990s when it first was 
proposed in legal cases, it certainly is not now, thirty-six years later.205 Conse-
quently, the theory is no longer a novel or innovative way of understanding the 
relationship between children and their parents.206 
In the interest of considering other factors under Daubert, courts should 
also consider the possible ramifications of allowing expert testimony on paren-
tal alienation.207 Because it is often raised when there is an allegation of abuse 
by one parent, a finding of parental alienation is functionally saying that a 
child is lying about the abuse.208 Ignoring these allegations, or finding them 
non-credible on the basis of a controversial theory, puts courts at risk of be-
coming culpable in the perpetuation of child abuse.209 
C. Testimony About Parental Alienation Is Also Inadmissible  
for Public Policy Reasons 
Although there are certainly evidentiary reasons to exclude testimony 
about parental alienation under almost every evidentiary standard, there are 
                                                                                                                           
 203 See Wendy McElroy, Battered Women’s Syndrome: Science or Sham, INDEP. INST. (Oct. 28, 
2002), https://www.independent.org/news/article.asp?id=11 [https://perma.cc/XS76-UPCR] (suggest-
ing that battered woman syndrome is an anti-feminist way to excuse women’s behavior). Battered 
woman syndrome was first theorized in 1979, and by 2000, it had achieved recognition by the psycho-
logical and psychiatric community, as evidenced through its presence in the DSM-IV-TR. Walker, 
Battered Woman Syndrome, supra note 86. Battered woman syndrome has also been used in court 
cases in the context of self-defense and culpable negligence. See Mott v. Stewart, No. 98–CV–239, 
2002 WL 31017646, at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2002) (holding that the defendant should have been 
allowed to bring in testimony on battered woman syndrome to negate her culpability in a child abuse 
case); Pickle v. State, 635 S.E.2d 197, 201, 203–04 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that testimony about 
battered person syndrome was admissible to rebut a mens rea, or knowledge, element); State v. Stew-
art, 719 S.E.2d 876, 885 (W. Va. 2011) (allowing an expert to testify on the theory of battered woman 
syndrome).  
 204 See supra notes 174–183 and accompanying text (arguing that parental alienation has not 
achieved general acceptance in the psychological community). 
 205 Walker, Empirical Findings, supra note 86 (implying that battered woman syndrome is no 
longer a new concept). 
 206 See id. 
 207 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (highlighting the flexibility 
of the Daubert factors); see infra notes 210–223 and accompanying text (pointing to the danger that 
comes with admission of parental alienation expert testimony). 
 208 GARDNER, supra note 14, at 3 (suggesting that many children lie about sex abuse because of a 
variety of influences inherent to a child custody dispute). 
 209 See generally MEIER ET AL., supra note 156 (articulating findings that parental alienation 
lessens the likelihood that a court will find an allegation of domestic violence or child abuse to be 
credible). 
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also public policy reasons to do so.210 First, labelling a child with parental al-
ienation problematizes what can be a very normal behavior.211 In the past, 
when a child was acting out or appeared to have a conduct disorder, mental 
health professionals always considered the home environment as a possible 
“cause” for the behavior.212 Under a theory of parental alienation, the focus 
shifts from the home and environment to the alleged mental disorder of the 
child.213 Furthermore, diagnoses, whether from a psychologist or the court, can 
have a profound impact on children by stigmatizing them as mentally ill.214 To 
accept parental alienation as a legitimate and applicable theory, then, may 
harm children more than it helps them, especially when the cause of the prob-
lematic behavior is likely complicated.215 
Second, parties often raise parental alienation in cases involving domestic 
violence.216 Proponents of the theory generally agree that domestic violence in 
the home is an acceptable reason for rejection of one parent, but they do not 
begin to address how to determine when domestic violence is “real” and when 
it is not.217 The proposed symptoms of parental alienation are also strikingly 
similar to PTSD, suggesting that perhaps parental alienation behaviors come 
from an exposure to trauma in the home.218 
                                                                                                                           
 210 See Walker & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 266 (highlighting the ways in which a parental aliena-
tion diagnosis may negatively impact children). Although public policy concerns may not fit into a 
determination of whether a theory is valid scientific evidence, they may be instructive in deciding how 
helpful the testimony actually is in the first place. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–94 (holding that the 
factors described in Daubert are not exhaustive). 
 211 Walker & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 267. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id.; see Kate Allsop et al., Heterogeneity in Psychiatric Diagnostic Classification, 279 PSY-
CHIATRY RSCH. 15, 21 (2019) (concluding that the DSM-5, in creating diagnostic categories, oversim-
plifies individual experiences of stress). 
 214 Walker & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 270. 
 215 Id. at 267–70; Craig Anne Heflinger & Stephen P. Hinshaw, Stigma in Child and Adolescent 
Mental Health Services Research: Understanding Professional and Institutional Stigmatization of 
Youth with Mental Health Problems and Their Families, 37 ADMIN. POL’Y MENTAL HEALTH 61, 64–
67 (2010) (applying “existing stigma frameworks” to analyze the ways in which stigma surrounding 
child mental health diagnoses can be harmful to children and their families). 
 216 Walker & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 272; see MEIER ET AL., supra note 156, at 5 (examining 
the relationship between domestic violence, parental alienation, and “wins” and “losses” in family 
court). 
 217 Walker & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 272. 
 218 DSM-5, supra note 13, at 271–74. The DSM-5 definition of PTSD requires exposure to a 
trauma—such as witnessing domestic violence—and one of the following symptoms: (1) distressing 
memories; (2) distressing dreams; (3) flashbacks; (4) psychological distress at exposure to a resem-
blance of the traumatic event; or (5) physical reactions. Id. A child who refuses to visit a parent out of 
a stated fear could be demonstrating a symptom of PTSD or of parental alienation as proposed by 
Bernet. Id.; see BERNET, supra note 7, at app. A (explaining that a child who meets the diagnostic 
criteria for parental alienation disorder will avoid the parent). The treatment for the two behaviors, 
however, is very different. Walker & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 273. Parental alienation suggests that 
exposure to the feared parent will solve the rejection, whereas exposure can further exacerbate the 
symptoms of a child with PTSD. Id. 
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Finally, many consider parental alienation as a way to undercut genuine 
abuse allegations.219 Parental alienation is normally raised in cases where 
women have accused men of being abusive, and it has a uniquely gendered 
component dating back to its inception by Dr. Richard Gardner, despite the 
gender-neutral terminology used.220 A finding that involves parental alienation 
often results in a change in custody, solely to the parent who has been accused 
of abuse.221 Such changes in custody frequently are traumatic for children who 
already experience serious fear surrounding the rejected parent.222 Further-
more, if the abuse allegation is true, placing the child with the abusive parent 
can put the child in an incredibly dangerous position.223 
CONCLUSION 
Although people can comprehend the existence of child abuse in the ab-
stract, when confronted with a concrete accusation of abuse, it may be difficult 
to believe. In the context of a heated and contentious divorce where emotions 
are high and custody is at stake, some people will discredit these allegations of 
abuse because they see an incentive for a parent to lie. Parental alienation is 
one way to rationalize allegations of child abuse and domestic violence in a 
way that incorporates these “incentives.” 
Attempting to better explain what he saw as an increase in unwarranted 
allegations of child abuse, Dr. Richard Gardner proposed parental alienation 
syndrome. His original theory of parental alienation syndrome, resting in part 
upon gender stereotypes, posited that one parent—most typically the mother—
                                                                                                                           
 219 MEIER ET AL., supra note 156, at 3. 
 220 Walker & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 275. Feminist theorists often see parental alienation as a 
way to blame mothers, shifting accusations away from the father’s abuse. Id. Absent domestic abuse, 
true joint custody with shared responsibilities is preferable because it better achieves equality of the 
sexes. Id. Women seeking shared responsibility for children, then, have no reason to fabricate abuse 
allegations as Gardner suggested because doing so would result in sole custody. See id. But see 
GARDNER, supra note 14, at 23–24. 
 221 See, e.g., M.A. v. A.I., No. A-4021-11T1, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2887, at *5 (Sup. 
Ct. App. Div. Dec. 15, 2014); see also Reveal, Bitter Custody, supra note 1 (describing the abuse that 
the Ionescu children suffered at the hands of their mother even as they were transferred to her custo-
dy). 
 222 Walker & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 275; see Reveal, Bitter Custody, supra note 1 (detailing 
the emotional difficulty faced by Ana Ionescu and her brother due to acts of parental alienation). 
 223 See U.S. Divorce Child Murder Data, U.S. Child Murder & Divorce: A Snapshot, CTR. FOR 
JUD. EXCELLENCE, http://www.centerforjudicialexcellence.org/cje-projects-initiatives/child-murder-
data/ [https://perma.cc/N2VR-6E3H] (providing an overview of children murdered by their parental 
abusers in the context of high-conflict divorces); see also 58 Children Murdered by A Parent Who 
Could Have Been Saved: Filicide in U.S. Family Courts: A Snapshot Released by Judicial Watchdog, 
CTR. FOR JUD. EXCELLENCE (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.centerforjudicialexcellence.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/12/12516-Child-Murder-Release-for-website.pdf [https://perma.cc/MW4B-QRTV] 
(examining fifty-eight cases in which courts placed children in contact with parents who ultimately 
murdered them). 
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takes steps to alienate her child from the other parent. The syndrome remains 
incredibly controversial even after it has undergone numerous modifications. 
Family courts allow expert evidence of parental alienation syndrome and its 
more modern iteration, parental alienation, even though there is no consensus 
at this time on whether these experts should be permitted to testify. Under the 
Frye v. United States and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. stand-
ards, as well as state-based formulations, expert testimony regarding parental 
alienation does not appear to meet the test either standard requires for admissi-
bility. Furthermore, mistaken acceptance of parental alienation carries a serious 
concern for the safety and well-being of children and survivors of domestic 
violence. As a result, the theory regarding “unjustified” rejection should, itself, 
be rejected by the legal community and kept out of the family courtroom once 
and for all. 
ALYSSA G. RAO 
